OLD LYRICS, KNOCK-OFF VIDEOS, AND COPYCAT COMIC BOOKS: THE
FOURTH FAIR USE FACTOR IN U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Harry Potter author J.K. Rowling resorted to a mighty muggle defense against the
dark arts when she sued the New York Daily News for publishing excerpts from her latest
novel three days before its official release date.1 The issues involved sit at the core of
copyright law: creative expression, protection for unpublished works, and the effects of
unlicensed distribution. But while the excerpts may have been unlawful, their publication
no doubt added to the frenzied anticipation of fans waiting to purchase the 870-page book
once it hit the stores.
Any court opinion in this case will add to the current array of beliefs regarding
copyright law and “fair use.” The American legal system has long recognized that in
certain situations, the fair use of artistic works does not infringe upon the rights of
copyright holders. The fair use doctrine as codified in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright
Act of 19762 requires a balancing of four factors: the purpose and character of the
unlicensed use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the
copying, and the effect of such copying on the copyright holder’s potential market.3
Courts continue to struggle with fair use, especially when confronted with a) speculative
market predictions, and b) competing public and private interests in cases where acts of
copying result in a net benefit to the copyright holder’s potential market,4 such as in the
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Daily News Sued Over Harry Potter Scoop, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19, 2003, at C7.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
3
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
4
For purposes of this article, there is a “net benefit” or a “benefit” to the copyright holder’s potential
market if the copyright holder’s profits from sales of the copyrighted work are greater than they would have
been absent the unlicensed use. This formula does not factor in the copyright holder’s lost licensing
revenues because often no market for such licensing exists. However, whether any licensing market exists
2

Harry Potter case.5 The inherent difficulty in defining markets and in accurately
assessing gains and losses, combined with a historical bias in favor of private property
rights, has resulted in judicial uncertainty, inconsistency, and inaccuracy in applications
of the fourth fair use factor to situations where the copyright holder benefits.6
Despite judicial skepticism, unauthorized uses of copyrighted works have
benefited rather than destroyed several major industries. Among the most notable
examples are the Japanese manga (comic book) market, segments of the music industry,
and television broadcasting. What follows is a discussion of each of these examples.

and, if so, the extent of such a market, is a critical variable in analyzing the copyright holder’s potential
market, one which I will isolate and examine independently from the question of market benefit.
5
Courts have considered possible market benefit from an unlicensed use in the following cases: Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 n.21 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274-1275 (11th Cir. 2001); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp.,
235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144-46
(2d Cir. 1998); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998); Sundeman v. Seajay
Socy., 142 F.3d 194, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1998); Ringgold v. Black Ent., 126 F.3d 70, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1997);
Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1996); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc.
v. Publications Int’l , Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d
731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263-1264 (2d Cir. 1986); DC
Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982); Iowa St. U. Research Found., Inc. v.
Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Ent., Inc.,
192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 342-43 (D.N.J. 2002); Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 2001
WL 1518264, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofheinz v. AMC Prod., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140-141 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); A & M Rec., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 914-15 (N.D. Cal. 2000); UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month
Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 789-90 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp.
2d 701, 708-710 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Jackson v. Warner Bros. Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585, 591-592 (E.D. Mich.
1997); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan, Educ. Ctr., Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Md. 1997);
L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l , Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265, 1273-1274 (C.D. Cal. 1996);
Amsinck v. Colum. Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Adv. Computer Serv. of
Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E.D. Va. 1994); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publg. Co.,
836 F. Supp. 909, 921-22 (D. Mass. 1993); Lish v. Harper’s Mag. Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1104
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Wojnarowicz v. Am. Fam. Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Telerate Sys.,
Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 229-230 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1262
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Update Art, Inc. v. Maariv Israel Newsp., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 212-214 (D. Mass. 1986); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1539-1540 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Horn Abbot Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla Ltd., 601
F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atl. Co-op., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 360 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276, 279 (D. Pa. 1922).
6
See generally id.
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Three Examples
Japanese Comic Books
Manga—an expressive medium similar to what Americans call comic books or
graphic novels7—account for nearly one-third of the revenue earned by the entire
Japanese publishing industry.8 The mammoth interest in manga has spawned a
subsidiary industry known as dojinshi, which consist of manga stories featuring wellknown, copyrighted manga characters written about and drawn for the most part by
unauthorized authors and artists.9 Dojinshi—which are sold on the Internet, at
conventions that attract tens of thousands of enthusiastic fans,10 and at a small number of
major bookstores11—have not been a consistent target of copyright litigation in Japan.12
Instead, manga authors and publishers have tolerated (and in some cases encouraged) the
proliferation of dojinshi, with several manga publishers regularly advertising their
7

See generally Salil Mehra, Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My
Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 155 (2002).
8
Id. at 157 (citing Nicole Gaouette, Get Your Manga Here: An Ancient Japanese Art Form – Book-Length
Comic Strips – Is Catching on in the U.S., CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 8, 1999, at 13).
9
Id. at 156. Dojinshi are similar to the fan fiction commonly found on the Internet. See Michelle Pauli,
Fan Fiction, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 5, 2002, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/online/story/0,3605,853539,00.html (“In this curious literary genre that is
flourishing on the net, fans of a particular book, TV series or film write their own stories using established
characters and settings. Click on to http://fanfiction.net, the largest repository of fan fiction on the web, and
you will find nearly 50,000 original stories written by Harry Potter addicts using Rowling’s characters.”);
David Plotz, Luke Skywalker is Gay?: Fan Fiction is America’s Literature of Obsession, SLATE, Apr. 14,
2000, at http://slate.msn.com/id/80225/ (“In ‘fanfic,’ as practitioners call it, devotees of a TV show, movie,
or (less often) book write stories about its characters. They chronicle the alternative adventures of Xena,
warrior princess; open the X-Files that Mulder and Scully don’t dare touch; and fill in the back story to Star
Wars Episode I.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in
Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129 (2001); Jessica Elliott, Copyright Fair Use and Private Ordering: Are
Copyright Holders and the Copyright Law Fanatical For Fansites?, 11 J. ART & ENT. L. 329 (2001);
Meredith McCardle, Note, Fan Fiction, Fandom, and Fanfare: What’s All the Fuss?, 9 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 433 (2003).
10
Mehra, supra note 7, at 156-57, 164-65; Lawrence Lessig, Copy Cats and Robotic Dogs: What Lawyers
Can Learn from Comic Books, RED HERRING, Jan. 10, 2003, at
http://www.herring.com/mag/issue121/5636.html (“Dojinshi conventions are among Japan’s largest mass
gatherings, drawing more than 450,000 fans and 33,000 artists each year.”).
11
Mehra, supra note 7, at 158 (citing Sharon Kinsella, Japanese Subculture in the 1990s: Otaku and the
Amateur Manga Movement, 24 J. JAP. STUD. 289, 295 (1998)).
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products at dojinshi conventions.13 The non-creative sections of the publishing industry
(printers and binders) produce dojinshi14 and have therefore definitely prospered from
dojinshi sales.15 But the mainstream manga products also benefit because dojinshi help
promote the original comic book characters.16 The phenomenon is a prime example of
how widespread copying can augment the market for copyrighted works.
Digital Musical Sampling
Adapting the work of one artist (usually from an earlier era) to create something
new has become a common practice in the music industry, especially among rap artists.17
In a process known as “digital sampling,” excerpts from previously recorded works are
incorporated verbatim into new songs, including the voices of the original singers.18 The
practice expanded in the 1980s with the invention and increasing affordability of Musical

12

Mehra, supra note 7, at 184.
Id.
14
Eric Prideaux, By the People, For the People, THE JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, available at
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fl20030323a2.htm (“And though their creators are
mainly amateurs, the paper and printing quality of many dojinshi rivals or exceeds that of the thick, gaudy
manga on pulp paper that weigh down konbini shelves from Hokkaido to Okinawa.”); Mary Kennard,
Amateur Manga Flourishing, THE DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Jan. 26, 2002, at 11 (“Production quality is
extremely high. Dojinshi are usually offset-printed, with professional-level binding and high-grade paper.
Print runs vary widely. Popular groups, or circles, might print as many as 5,000 of one dojinshi, while lessknown circles might only print 100 copies.”).
15
Kennard, supra note 14 (“Dojinshi support a significant financial sector, from art supplies to printing
companies to delivery services. There are about 100 small printing companies that specialize in printing
just these books.”).
16
See Mehra, supra note 7, at 184, 191.
17
See Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis
Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 182 (2002); Henry Self, Comment, Digital Sampling: A Cultural
Perspective, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 347, 350-51 (2002); Margaret E. Watson, Unauthorized Digital
Sampling in Musical Parody: A Haven in the Fair Use Doctrine?, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 469, 474-75
(1999); Matthew G. Passmore, Note, A Brief Return to the Digital Sampling Debate, 20 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 833, 838-39 (1998) (“Since the 1980’s, rap music has relied heavily on the use of digital
samples.”); Sherri Carl Hampel, Note, Are Samplers Getting a Bum Rap?: Copyright Infringement or
Technological Creativity?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 560 (“Part of the innovation in rap music is the use of
digital samples.”); Jason H. Marcus, Note, Don’t Stop That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of Digital
Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 767, 770-72 (1991).
18
See Wilson, supra note 17, at 179 (citing Donald S. Passman, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
MUSIC BUSINESS 306 (2000)).
13
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Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI) synthesizers.19 Many current performers argue that
sampling benefits original artists by encouraging the purchase of the primary source.20
Unauthorized sampling was at the center of a 1994 U.S. Supreme Court case,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.21 The rap group 2 Live Crew used portions of an
original work in a parody of Roy Orbison’s well-known hit “Pretty Woman.”22 In
recognizing the song as a parody, the Court acknowledged that 2 Live Crew had
transformed the original source in a creative fashion23 and therefore that the appropriation
possibly qualified as an instance of fair use.24 However, while the Court reversed an
appellate court’s finding that the newer song’s commercial purpose made the use
“presumptively unfair,”25 it also warned the lower court against finding summary
judgment in favor of 2 Live Crew because of inconclusive evidence regarding the
appropriation’s negative effect on the copyright holder’s derivative markets.26 As to
possible market benefit, the Court stated, “Judge Leval gives the example of the film
producer’s appropriation of a composer’s previously unknown song that turns the song
into a commercial success; the boon to the song does not make the film’s simple copying
19

See David Sanjek,“Don’t Have to DJ No More”: Sampling and the “Autonomous” Creator, 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 607, 612 (1992).
20
See, e.g., Passmore, supra note 17, at 839 (“Many record labels view mix tapes [composed of samples of
previous recordings] as ‘a form of promotion and marketing for the [original] artist[s],’ and thus tacitly
sanction the distribution of mix tapes that feature the label’s artists.”) (quoting Anita M. Samuels, New
Urban Art Form, Old Copyright Problem: A Music Industry at Odds on ‘Mix Tapes,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1996, at C8).
21
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
22
Id. at 571.
23
The concept of transformative use is discussed in Part II-B and Part IV-B, infra.
24
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-83. Furthermore, the Court restated an intolerance of unauthorized sampling
that simply duplicates the original work rather than transforming it. Id. at 591-92 (“[W]hen a commercial
use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the
original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the
original will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market substitution is at
least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125 (1990) [hereinafter Leval, Fair Use Standard]).
25
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94.
26
Id. at 593-94.
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fair.”27 Along with other courts, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to adequately consider
the potential benefits of sampling on the market for the copyrighted work.
Television Broadcasting and Video Recorders
Television broadcasters share something in common with music companies in that
technological innovations have opened the door for the widespread unauthorized copying
of original works. But television differs from music and comic books in terms of how
revenue is collected—that is, broadcasters sell advertising whereas the bulk of music and
comic book profits comes from selling tangible products. Thus, the recording of
television programs does not harm individual creators and artists (who are at the center of
copyright law protections) but rather expands the potential viewing audience for both a
program and the advertisements aired during it.28 Recognizing this benefit in Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the U. S. Supreme Court described the delayed
watching of videotaped television shows as a “time shifting” activity protected under the
fair use doctrine.29 This serves as an example of how electronic or digital copying
enhances the market for copyrighted works.
***
The three examples above are significantly different in terms of their legal and
economic implications. The Japanese manga and dojinshi markets co-exist because the
latter benefits the former and because there is less incentive to litigate under Japanese

27

Id. at 591 n.21 (citing Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1124 n.84 (1990)).
Recent recording technology which allows users to skip commercials would require a different analysis.
See Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New Digital VCRs: Introducing TiVo to
Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (2002); Chris Sprigman, Are Personal Video Recorders Such
as ReplayTV and TiVo Copyright-Infringement Devices?, May 9, 2002, at
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20020509_sprigman.html (discussing Paramount Pictures v.
SonicBlue, where the plaintiffs claimed that commercial skipping technology contributed to the
infringement of their copyrights).
29
464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
28

6

copyright law than under its American counterpart.30 However, the opinions in cases
such as Sony and Campbell reflect the inconsistency among lower courts as to how much
weight to afford net market benefit from an unlicensed use.31 In Sony, the Court
emphasized the ways that electronic or digital copying enhance the market for
copyrighted material,32 while in Campbell it expressed skepticism over the supposed
benefit of electronic manipulation—an increase in the market for a dated product.33 Such
irregular applications of the fair use doctrine reveal judges’ differing conceptualizations
of fair use and copyright law.
Legal and economic theorists who discuss fair use in terms of transaction costs34
suggest that users should pay fair market value to copyright holders to license their works
and that narrowly defined parameters for fair use best protect the incentives of artists and
authors to create.35 According to their incentive-based models, these scholars argue that
in an environment of low or non-existent transaction costs, judicial intervention on behalf
30

Mehra, supra note 7, at 185-86. According to Professor Mehra, there is less incentive to litigate under
Japanese copyright law because of the design of the Japanese legal system. It inhibits litigation as a result
of few lawyers and long delays. See id.
31
See generally supra note 5.
32
Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-55.
33
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-94.
34
See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. OF LEG. STUD. 325 (1989); Michael G. Anderson &
Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 143 (1993); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Tom W. Bell, Escape from
Copyright: Market Success v. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV.
741, 758 (2001) [hereinafter Bell, Escape] (“Courts and commentators agree that copyright law represents
a statutory response to market failure.”) (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948)); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law
in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair
Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions,
and "Aggressive Neutrality," 13 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281
(1970).
35
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 34; Breyer, supra note 34; William M. Landes, Copyright,
Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 5 (2000)
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of unlicensed users decreases or eliminates incentives for innovation.36 Thus, they
believe that application of fair use is only appropriate where there are high transaction
costs or other barriers to licensing copyrighted works.37 These theorists think that fair
use should be regarded as a defense and not a limitation on a copyright holder’s exclusive
rights,38 primarily because they fail to properly recognize extrinsic social and other noneconomic benefits from the unlicensed use of copyrighted works.39
Critics of this analysis rightfully note that an incentive-based model offers little
guidance for those courts wanting to draw a clear line between fair and unfair use, one
that maximizes the incentive to create without giving artists extraneous benefits.40
Infringement claims asserted in cases where the unlicensed use increases the copyright
holder’s potential market—such as sampling and taping television shows—draw
additional skepticism to this model. Economic theorists believe copyright law should
preserve the right of copyright holders to choose between profiting from licensing their
works and relying on uncertain economic benefits from an enhanced market.41 But to
preserve that choice, the copyright holder who litigates successfully should not receive
statutory or other compensatory damages42 as well as the benefits of an enhanced market.

(“[T]he incentive to create new works will be significantly undermined without protection against
unauthorized copying.”).
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 49 (1997).
39
See id.
40
See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 483 (1996).
41
See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual Property Law: Configuring the
System for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167, 171-72 (2000).
42
“The Copyright Act permits a prevailing copyright owner in an infringement action to obtain both
monetary and nonmonetary relief. The available nonmonetary relief includes injunctive relief and
affirmative equitable relief, while the monetary remedies include statutory damages, compensatory
damages, infringers’ profits, and costs and attorneys’ fees.” Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in
Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 9 (1999).
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Rather, the copyright holder who is successful in litigation should forgo the benefit of an
enhanced market by having that benefit offset monetary damages.
Perhaps a better explanation would be that in most cases in which copying results
in a net increase to the copyright holder’s market, market failure is not the result of high
transaction costs but of the copyright holder not wanting to enter into a licensing
relationship with the user in the first place. In these cases, market failure occurs when the
copyright holder takes offense unrelated to economic harm. In the absence of fair use,
injunctive relief,43 rather than monetary damages, may be more appropriate. However,
this type of market failure is more likely to occur when an unauthorized user transforms a
copyrighted work, which often leads to a finding of fair use and moots the question of the
appropriate remedy.
Many critics of the economic model conceptualize fair use not as a defense but as
a limit on the exclusive rights of the copyright holder in cases in which the unlicensed use

Damages for copyright infringement are provided for in Section 504 of the Copyright Act. 17
U.S.C. § 504(a) (2003) (“[A]n infringer is liable for either 1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any
additional profits of the infringer … ; or 2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).”).
Accordingly, a copyright owner successful in litigation must decide between actual and statutory damages.
To determine the amount of actual damages, a court considers profits that the copyright owner lost because
of the infringement (competitive sales), as well as any additional profits earned by the infringer as a result
of the unlicensed use of the copyrighted work (noncompetitive sales). See generally 1 JOHN GLADSTONE
MILLS, III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6:90 (2d ed. 2002).
Alternatively, a copyright owner can seek statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). Courts have
broad discretion in calculating statutory damages. According to § 504(c), statutory damages can range
from $750 to $30,000 per “occurrence” of infringement, but can reach as much as $150,000 if the court
finds that the infringement was “willful.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Statutory damages are most relevant to the
analysis in this article because in cases of market benefit, the copyright holder does not have any lost
profits (apart from potential lost licensing revenues). Also possibly relevant are monetary awards that, in
effect, disgorge the infringer of its non-competitive profits from the unlicensed use. I take up this measure
of damages briefly in Part V-B, infra.
43
See Ciolino, supra note 42, at 9-11 (“Courts generally grant preliminary injunctive relief in copyright
cases when the owner proves the reasonable likelihood that he will succeed on the merits. While proof of
irreparable harm is a prerequisite to the granting of preliminary equitable relief in most federal cases, courts
in copyright cases typically presume the existence of irreparable harm. … Likewise, courts readily enter
permanent injunctions upon proof of ‘past infringement and a substantial likelihood of future
infringement.’”) (citing, inter alia, Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94
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is transformative.44 They perceive fair use as an example of market failure because the
market does not support transformative uses that add social, non-monetary value to the
copyrighted work.45 This approach has its own flaws: not every transformative use is a
fair use, and some non-transformative uses, including several that serve such public goals
as education and public adjudication, are fair in certain cases. Both courts and scholars
have found it difficult to balance the economic interests of copyright holders with the
benefits to the public domain of a transformative or public46 use.47
When there exists a potential net increase to the copyright holder’s market with
no evidence of market harm, courts should (and, for the most part, do) recognize
transformative and public uses as fair, as such findings successfully balance a copyright
holder’s economic rights with the public interest.48 But if the use is non-transformative
and private, then the increase to the copyright holder’s market should, at a minimum,
offset damages even if the use is deemed unfair. In this article, I will analyze cases in
which an unlicensed use enhances a copyright holder’s market. More often than not,

(2d Cir. 1977); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984); Atari, Inc.
v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 1982)).
44
See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449 (1997) [hereinafter Leval,
Rescued]; infra note 89 (defining “transformative”).
45
See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975
(2002) [hereinafter Lunney, Jr., Market Failure]; Bell, Escape, supra note 34; Loren, supra note 38; Mark
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997);
Wendy J. Gordon, The “Market Failure” and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002); Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and
Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589 (2002); Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The
“Transformative” Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2002).
46
As explained in Part IV-B, infra, a public use, whether commercial or not, is a use that furthers some
governmental purpose such as education.
47
See generally supra notes 5, 34, and 45.
48
See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d
18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617(9th Cir. 1996);
Hofheinz v. AMC Prod., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140-141 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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applying the fair use doctrine in these cases calls into question the accepted notion of
copyrights as property.49
In Part II, I will look at the origins of the fair use doctrine, explain the four
statutory factors that courts use to analyze fair use, and examine how the U.S. Supreme
Court has addressed unlicensed uses that possibly enhance the copyright holder’s
potential market. In Part III, I will discuss how fair use is conceptualized under the
predominant theories of intellectual property and how any use that increases a copyright
holder’s market may be classified under those theories. Part IV consists of an analysis
and categorization of all fair use cases in which individual courts have recognized
potential net increases to a copyright holder’s market, as well as a framework for a
public/private dichotomy in place of the commercial/non-commercial dichotomy
prevalent in fair use jurisprudence. In Part V, I reject economic market failure as an
explanation for many fair use claims. I then describe a doctrinal framework for
resolving fair use claims in cases in which an unlicensed use increases a copyright
holder’s market and reconcile that framework with the predominant intellectual property
theories. In Part VI, I will offer suggestions for developing a paradigm to look more
generally at fair use, copyright law, and intellectual property rights.

49

See generally Douglas Y’Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right Conferred by Copyright,
49 MERCER L. REV. 643 (1998); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287
(1988) [hereinafter Hughes, Philosophy] (“In the centuries since our founding, the concept of property has
changed dramatically in the United States. … A less frequently discussed trend is that historically
recognized but nonetheless atypical forms of property, such as intellectual property, are becoming
increasingly important relative to the old paradigms of property, such as farms, factories, and
furnishings.”); Tussey, supra note 9, at 1170 (“Labor-desert, based on John Locke’s writings concerning
real property, assumes the natural property right of the creator of an intellectual property work.”).
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II.

FAIR USE AND THE FOURTH FACTOR

Combining a look at the history of the fair use doctrine, the four factors delineated
by Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of fair use lays an appropriate
foundation for reconsidering modern-day applications of the doctrine. To develop a new
fair use framework requires a clear understanding of the doctrine and its purpose.
A.

The History of the Fair Use Doctrine
Central to U.S. copyright law,50 the fair use doctrine51 balances the private rights

of copyright holders with thepublic’s interest in accessing and using copyrighted works.
As interpreted by the courts, the main purpose of U.S. copyright law is to give artists
sufficient protection for original creations so as to provide them adequate incentives for
creating new works, while giving the public the right to use existing works under
specifically defined conditions.52
The fair use principle53 can be traced to eighteenth-century England, a time during
which English courts54 tried to establish a delicate balance between promoting the arts
and sciences as part of the public domain and protecting property rights of artists and

50

See, e.g., Anderson & Brown, supra note 34, at 153 (Fair use is a “necessary part of copyright law, the
observance of which is essential to achieve the goals of that law.”).
51
The term “fair use” was coined in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136)
(addressing the question of “whether there has been a legitimate use, in the fair exercise of a mental
operation, deserving the character of an original work, or whether matter has been taken colorably, animo
furandi”).
52
See, e.g., Blaine C. Kimrey, Amateur Guitar Player’s Lament II: A Critique of A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., and a Clarion Call For Copyright Harmony in Cyberspace, 20 REV. LITIG. 309, 319 (2001)
(“Copyright serves two countervailing purposes. The first purpose is to help authors protect their works so
they will have an incentive to produce. The second purpose is to facilitate public access to those works.”)
(citations omitted).
53
“Fair use” was known as “fair abridgment” in the early English cases. See Loren, supra note 38, at 1314.
54
The early English cases included the following: Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740); Dodsley
v.Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1761); Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 4 Esp. 168 (K.B. 1802);
Roworth v. Wilkes, 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B. 1807).
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inventors.55 But as courts were primarily concerned with protecting private property
rights, they generally ruled that an unauthorized use was unfair if it harmed the market
for the original work by competing against it.56 In seeking to prevent unwanted market
competition, the courts were only somewhat mindful of the public benefit of certain
unlicensed uses and allowed copying to proceed under narrowly-prescribed
circumstances if they found that the use added to the public domain.57
The first American appropriation of the fair use doctrine occurred in the 1841
case of Folsom v. Marsh.58 The defendant, who had written a biography of George
Washington, was sued for using excerpts of letters from the plaintiff’s copyrighted and
published biography of the first president. In finding for the plaintiff, the Massachusetts
federal district court considered the factors59 that were later accepted universally as part
of the modern fair use doctrine.60 In Folsom, Justice Story listed those factors as the
“nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used,
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supercede the objects, of the original work.”61

55

See Loren, supra note 38, at 13-15 (citing William F. Patry, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAW 3, 6-18, 171 (2d ed. 1995)).
56
See, e.g., Roworth, 170 Eng. Rep. at 890 (When “so much is extracted that it communicates the same
knowledge [as] the original work, it is an actionable violation of literary property.”).
57
See Loren, supra note 38, at 13-15. See also Cary, 4 Esp. at 170. In Cary, the court remarked to the
jury that “a man may fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use of another’s labours for
the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public: but having done so, the question will be, was the
matter so taken used fairly with that view, and without what I may term the animus [or the intention to
steal].” Id.
58
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
59
The “nature and objects of the selections made” split into the first two factors of the modern fair use
doctrine.
60
The four factors comprising the fair use doctrine are “(1) The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
61
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
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It took Congress 130 years following the Folsom decision to incorporate the fair
use doctrine into statutory law62 when it established limitations on a copyright holder’s
exclusive rights63 in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. According to its
legislative history, the Act was created to “restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”64 Based on a constitutional mandate,65
Congress first passed copyright legislation in 1790 to protect artists, “mainly with a view
to inducing them to give their ideas to the public, so that they may be added to the
intellectual store, accessible to people, and that they may be used for the intellectual
advancement of mankind.”66 These objectives were identical to those established by
English courts in the preceding century but have been questioned by scholars in recent
years.67

62

See Loren, supra note 38, at 19 (explaining that around 1955, Congress debated whether fair use needed
to be codified as it had existed for over a century as a judicially created and enforced doctrine. Of the
experts Congress consulted, eight of the nine believed that fair use could remain a judicial doctrine;
however, as history makes clear, Congress ultimately went forward with codification of the doctrine.)
(citing Alan Latman, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 2D
SESS., STUDY NO. 14 ON FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 39-44 (Comm. Print 1960)).
63
The six exclusive rights guaranteed to copyright owners in the Copyright Act of 1976 were:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
65
The constitutional mandate was “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66
Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
67
See, e.g., Loren, supra note 38, at 47-48, 56 (“Courts should instead focus on what rule would best serve
the public interest. Courts should ask if the overall public is better served by permitting the kind of use at
64
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Since 1976, various courts have offered barometers for determining the fairness of
unlicensed uses.68 However, judges continue to struggle because of the uncertainty of
fact-specific inquiries that are required in copyright infringement cases69 and because
there does not appear to be any universal understanding of how the four factors play out
in different types of cases.70 Neither Congress nor the courts have created strict rules for
applying the doctrine in various situations. As a result, courts have applied fair use
inconsistently,71 which has increased the confusion over the doctrine.
Most courts have interpreted fair use as an affirmative defense to copyright
infringement rather than as a limitation on the scope of a copyright holder’s rights.72

issue without the obligation to pay the copyright owner.”); Lunney, Jr., Market Failure, supra note 45, at
996 (“The primary purpose of copyright is neither to protect the natural or moral rights of authors nor to
reward copyright owners. Rather, copyright’s primary purpose is to ensure the public an adequate supply of
copyrighted works.”); Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1213,
1217 (1997) (“[T]he ultimate goal of copyright law … is to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.’”); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53
FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don’t Throw Out the
Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403.
68
See, e.g., supra note 5.
69
See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Fair use is a
doctrine the application of which always depends on consideration of the precise facts at hand.”) (citing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991);
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976) (“[N]o generally applicable definition [of fair use]
is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.”); Mura v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (D.C.N.Y.1965)).
70
See, e.g., William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 169294 (1988) [hereinafter Fisher, Fair Use]; Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 62 (1998) (“Although attempts have been made, the fair use doctrine has not been
reduced to a single form susceptible of straightforward application. Authorities regularly call fair use so
malleable as to be indeterminate.”); Jay Dratler, Distilling the Witches’ Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit,
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1992).
71
See id.
72
The question is whether the fair use doctrine benefits the defendant by providing the defendant with a
larger shield, or does it instead provide the plaintiff with a smaller sword? Fair use is usually described as a
defense to copyright infringement—a “privilege” to use a copyrighted work in a reasonable manner without
the copyright owner’s consent—but sometimes is described as a “limitation” upon the rights of copyright
owners. Compare Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (fair
use is a “privilege”); Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950) (same); with Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 461-62 (1984) (“Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants
the owner of a copyright a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work … This grant expressly is
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According to Lydia Loren, courts “have not fully embraced the importance of fair use as
a counterbalance to the limited monopoly rights granted to copyright owners.”73 Loren’s
interpretation seems most consistent with the balance that courts need to strike between
public and private rights.74 What is for certain, however, is that amid the confusion in
interpreting and applying the four fair use factors lies ambiguity regarding the purpose of
the doctrine.
B.

The Four Factors
The four fair use factors75 that Congress included in the Copyright Act of 1976

are: “(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a

made subject to 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limitations on the copyright owner’s
rights.”). However, these two conflicting views are often confused. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) (“The judicial doctrine of fair use, one of the most important and wellestablished limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners, would be given express statutory
recognition for the first time in section 107. The claim that a defendant’s acts constituted a fair use rather
than an infringement has been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright actions over the years, and
there is ample case law recognizing the existence of the doctrine and applying it.”).
73
Loren, supra note 38, at 5. Professor Loren explains, “[I]t is in some ways a unique idea that the public
has the right to make certain kinds of uses of another’s property. These permitted uses, however, are an
important part of what allows copyright to promote knowledge and learning in the United States.” Id.
(citing L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS
109-122 (1991); Richard Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. 291,
293 (1996); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 37
(1993); United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985)).
74
This is the author’s view of the fair use defense. There is disagreement as to whether fair use offers
limited exceptions to a copyright holder’s exclusive rights or whether it sets a boundary between where the
copyright holder’s rights end and where the public’s rights begin. Compare John Carlin, Culture Vultures:
Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 135 (1988) (fair
use “is an existing doctrine which the courts can employ to discriminate between purely commercial
exploitation and the need for art to develop and create on its own terms, not those dictated by copyright
law”); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987)
(characterizing copyright as “an encroachment on the public domain, justified only if it provides the public
with some form of compensation”); Loren, supra note 38, at 3-4 (“Copyright law in this country is often
spoken of as a balance between the rights granted to copyright owners and the rights guaranteed to the
users of copyrighted materials”); with William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and
Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (“Fair use limits the
rights of the copyright holder by allowing unauthorized copying in circumstances that are roughly
consistent with promoting economic efficiency.”).
75
Congress did not intend for the four factors to be exclusive. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“The factors enumerated in [Section 107] are not meant to be
exclusive.”); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976) (“[T]he courts have evolved a set of
criteria which, though in no case definitive or determinative, provide some gauge for balancing the
equities.”); Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 70, at 687 (“Fair use is a weighing process involving

16

commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.”76 Courts have generally interpreted the law as
requiring a balancing of all four factors.77
According to the Section 107 preamble, legitimate fair use purposes are
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research.”78 However, uses for these specific purposes are neither
exempt from the four factor analysis,79 nor are all other instances excluded.80
Consequently, fair use analysis is viewed as a difficult,81 fact-intensive,82 and
discretionary process requiring case-by- case examination.83

nonexclusive and multifaceted factors.”); Lemley, supra note 45, at 1024 n.171 (“Section 107 provides a
list of four nonexclusive factors to consider in determining whether a particular use is fair.”); Tussey, supra
note 9, at 1144 n.40 (“The court may have added a transformative or productive use requirement to the
usual four factors, though the precise scope of that requirement is unclear.”) (citing Laura G. Lape, Fair
Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995)).
76
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
77
See, e.g, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“Nor may the four statutory
factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in
light of the purposes of copyright.”).
78
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
79
As the House Report explains,
For example, the reference to fair use “by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means” is mainly intended to make clear that the doctrine has as much
application to photocopying and taping as to older forms of use; it is not intended to give
these kinds of reproduction any special status under the fair use provision or to sanction
any reproduction beyond the normal and reasonable limits of fair use. Similarly, the
newly-added reference to “multiple copies for classroom use” is a recognition that, under
the proper circumstances of fairness, the doctrine can be applied to reproductions of
multiple copies for the members of a class.
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1976).
See id. (“The examples enumerated … while by no means exhaustive, give some idea of the sort of
activities the courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances.”).
81
Judge Learned Hand once described the fair use doctrine as “the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
82
See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1177, 1191 (2002) (“The inquiry is heavily fact-intensive, with no one factor determinative.”); Matthew
80
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1.

First Factor: “Purpose and Character of Use”

Courts have focused on three dichotomies in applying the first fair use factor.
The first is the distinction between non-licensed uses for commercial purposes versus
those for non-commercial purposes.84 Congress did not intend for courts to use this
factor to restrict the fair use doctrine to educational or non-profit uses but rather wanted
to ensure that commercial motivation was considered in judicial analyses.85 A
commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use,86 whereas a non-commercial use
militates toward such a finding.87

Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New
Markets, and the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1183 (2000) (“The structure of the fair use inquiry
emphasizes fact-intensive analysis and a delicate balancing of interests.”).
83
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“[E]ach case . . .
must be decided on its own facts” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976));
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not to be simplified with
bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”).
84
The precise inquiry undertaken by the courts is not whether the unauthorized use is part of a commercial
work, but whether the unlicensed user exploits the copyrighted work for commercial gain. See, e.g.,
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (“The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price.”).
85
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
86
See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (finding that “although every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright,
noncommercial uses are a different matter.”).
87
See id. Courts favor non-commercial uses because they are more consistent with the objectives of the
Copyright Act to promote progress in the arts and sciences. See, e.g., Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 70.
As to the misguided reliance on whether an unlicensed use is commercial, they write:
By misinterpreting the language of the statute and reading too much into dicta from the
two major Supreme Court opinions on fair use, some courts have altered radically the
traditional approach to the doctrine. Rather than examining all of the circumstances
bearing on [the first and fourth] factors as well as the fair use inquiry as a whole, they
have resorted to a simplistic judgment call turning on a characterization of the use as
either commercial or not.
Id. at 670-71 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539; Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522
(9th Cir. 1992); New Era Pubs. Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1506-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Eveready Battery Co. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F.
Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Original
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The second dichotomy88 is between transformative uses89 and non-transformative
uses.90 Transformative uses that courts have looked upon favorably include
commentaries,91 criticisms92 and parodies93 because they add value to the public domain

Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986); DC Comics
Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986)).
88
Courts take up the question of whether an unlicensed use is transformative primarily under the first fair
use factor. Bunker, supra note 45, at 4 (“The first factor … has been the prime site for the infiltration of
the ‘transformative use’ doctrine, although the doctrine has been considered in connection with other
statutory factors as well.”).
89
A transformative use alters or adds to the copyrighted work. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1111 (“Transformative uses may
include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original author, proving a fact, or
summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it. They may also include parody,
symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses.”); Laura G. Lape, supra note 75.
90
See, e.g., Bunker, supra note 45, at 2 (“The transformative use requirement is not one found among the
statutory fair use factors, and the Court acknowledged in Campbell that a use need not be transformative to
be fair. Despite that caveat, the notion of transformative use has increasingly been emphasized by lower
courts in subsequent fair use cases.”); Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (The books about beanie babies at issue “are not transformative, and, quite likely, not meant to be
transformative.”); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 335
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding the book nontransformative because the “chapters do not add anything substantial
that is new to the Star Trek story”); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding “[a]ny transformative purpose possessed by The [Seinfeld Aptitude Test] […] slight
to non-existent”); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding the book at issue was not transformative because “the substance and content of The Cat in the Hat
is not conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O.J. Simpson trial”).
91
See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (The
Wind Done Gone, a novel whose storyline provided a book-length commentary onGone With the Wind,
found to be transformative and fair); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21-22, 25 (1st Cir.
2000) (replication of one photograph published alongside newspaper commentary about controversial
photographs was transformative and fair).
92
See, e.g., Sundeman v. Seajay Socy., 142 F.3d 194, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1998) (“While [the paper] does
quote from and paraphrase substantially Blood of My Blood, its purpose is to criticize and comment on Ms.
Rawlings’ earliest work. Thus, Blythe’s transformative paper fits within several of the permissible uses
enumerated in § 107.”).
93
See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that an
advertisement featuring a parody of a copyrighted photograph of Demi Moore was a transformative fair
use) (“[T]he ad is not merely different; it differs in a way that may reasonably be perceived as commenting,
through ridicule, on what a viewer might reasonably think is the undue self-importance conveyed by the
subject of the Leibovitz photograph.”); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1277. But see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op Prod., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 360-61 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that
theatrical work Scarlett Fever copied extensively from the plot and characters of the movie Gone With the
Wind without providing commentary or criticism of the movie and therefore did not qualify as a parody or
a fair use). Some courts try to draw a further distinction between “parodies” and “satires” in light of the
Court’s dicta in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91, that “parody needs to mimic an original to make its point,
and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, whereas satire can stand on its
own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d
at 1268 (“Parody, which is directed toward a particular literary or artistic work, is distinguishable from
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and are not mere replications of what the copyright holder has already created.94
However, courts have also acknowledged that many uses that are not transformative—
especially uses for educational and other non-commercial purposes—are also fair.95
The final dichotomy is between the use of a copyrighted work for its factual or
historical content96 versus use for its mode of expression.97 Based on the original intent
of U.S. copyright law—that is, to protect creative expression, but not facts, ideas, or
history—,98 courts have looked unfavorably upon the duplication of copyrighted modes

satire, which more broadly addresses the institutions and mores of a slice of society.”); Barban v. Time
Warner, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4447, *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Parody is generally protected under the
fair use doctrine as a valued form of social and literary criticism. … Satire, on the contrary, mimics the
copyrighted work, using it as a ‘vehicle to poke fun at another target’ and is generally granted less
protection under the fair use doctrine.”); Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400.
94
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for
a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the
creation of transformative works.”); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1111 (“If … [the] use adds
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”).
95
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.11 (“[T]he obvious statutory exception to this focus on
transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution.”); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding non-transformative, non-commercial
home videotaping a fair use).
96
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“‘A Time to Heal’
may be characterized as an unpublished historical narrative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes
a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”); Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding use of factual content is fair use); Einhorn, supra note 45, at
591 n.16 (“The scope of fair use is more limited with respect to non-factual works than factual works; the
former necessarily involves more originality and creativity than the reporting of facts. … Factual works are
believed to have a greater public value and unauthorized uses of them are more readily tolerated by
copyright law.”) (citing New Era Publications Int’l v. Carol Publg. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (1990);
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (1987)).
97
See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 (“The copyright is limited to those aspects of a work—termed
‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s originality.”); Holdredge v. Knight Publg. Corp., 214
F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (rejecting fair use because defendant’s work “mirrors the manner and
style in which the plaintiff chose to set down the factual and historical material she used, and to express her
thoughts and conclusions”).
98
Facts, unlike expression, are part of the public domain so using them, without copying the expression
itself, is not something to which the copyright holder has exclusive rights. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 70,
at 240 (“Although copyright in a work of authorship protects the author’s particular manner of expression,
it does not protect the underlying facts or ideas.”) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-03, 104-05
(1880) (copyright does not protect a system of accounting forms); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
650 F.2d 1365, 1370-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (reporter’s research on facts in “news” not protected); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (facts and
speculation regarding historical event not protected); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 85 U.S. 1009 (1967) (biographical facts not protected);
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of expression, especially for commercial purposes.99 Because facts and ideas cannot be
copyrighted,100 the extent to which an alleged infringer copies a mode of expression (as
opposed to facts and ideas) also touches on the second fair use factor.
2.

Second Factor: “Nature of the Copyrighted Work”

Courts are required to assess “the value of the copyrighted materials used”101 and
the extent to which the materials are at “the core of intended copyright protection.”102
According to U.S. copyright law, the need to protect and disseminate works that are
“creative, imaginative, and original”103 is stronger than the need to protect works that are
informational104 or functional105 at their core.106 In addition, the second factor
encourages courts to consider whether a copyrighted work has been published,

1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 2.03[D], 2.11[A] (1988)); John R.
Therien, Comment, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use and
the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1005 (2001) (“Where it is not clear
whether the information presented in the secondary use is duplicative, courts can more easily presume the
use to be fair if the primary work is predominantly factual … ; [w]here the primary work is predominantly
fanciful, it is further from the core of information necessary to public decision making. Therefore, a
secondary use is less likely to present information of public value.”).
99
See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that in order to be a fair use, the parody must build solely on the subject of the copyrighted work itself—a
parody simply taking the copyrighted work’s style or tone will not constitute fair use); see also supra notes
96-98.
100
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”);
Y’Barbo, supra note 49, at 668 (“[C]opyright does not protect ideas but only the expression of those
ideas.”).
101
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
102
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
103
See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding “whether the work was
creative, imaginative, and original” critical to the fair use inquiry); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
626 F. Supp. 201, 211 (D. Mass. 1986) (fine art photographs of a surrealistic nature are creative,
imaginative, and original and therefore deserve heightened protection); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury
Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982).
104
See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (entries in telephone directory
are informational and uncopyrightable facts).
105
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (copyright on a book describing a functional system of
bookkeeping does not grant the copyright holder exclusive rights over the subsequent use and description
of the system); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding fair the use of
functional elements of a computer program).
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disseminated, or otherwise made part of the public domain prior to its unlicensed use.107
Courts provide unpublished works or works that have not otherwise been publicly
distributed greater protection in order to preserve the creator’s right to choose how and
when a work should be published, as well as the right to decide whether to publish it at
all.108
3.

Third Factor: “Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used”

Courts evaluate the amount and substance of the copyrighted work used by an
unlicensed user in relation to the original work as a whole.109 A review of relevant
cases110 reveals considerable latitude in terms of strictness, with one court holding that
even “a small degree of taking is sufficient to transgress . . . [a fair use claim] if the
copying is the essential part of the copyrighted work.”111 Other courts have ruled that
using a small amount of copyrighted material that is unrelated to the work’s creative core

106

See supra note 103.
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (“The fact that a
work is unpublished is a critical element of its ‘nature.’”).
108
See id. (“[T]he scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works.”); see also Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[W]e think that the tenor of the [Harper & Row]
Court’s entire discussion of unpublished works conveys the idea that such works normally enjoy complete
protection against copying any protected expression.”); New Era Publications Int’l , ApS v. Henry Holt &
Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Where use is made of materials of an ‘unpublished nature,’ the
second fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer, and we do not do so here.”); Kenneth D.
Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1 (1999); Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar, Thief: Fair Use and Unpublished Works, 9 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 15 (1990); Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use From the Right
of First Publicataion, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (2001).
109
See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984) (Use of 29 words from article of 2100 words was insubstantial and
therefore fair use); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (Use of film excerpts, though minimal, was
qualitatively substantial).
110
See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing Meeropol v.
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978)); Roy Export Co., 503 F.
Supp. at 1145; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936) (“No plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”).
111
Cable/Home Communications Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 844 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65).
107
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is de minimis112 and therefore does not weigh against fair use, and could even be cause to
reject the copyright holder’s claim of infringement.113 But most courts agree that the
extensive use of copyrighted material for the purpose of copying the mode of expression
never constitutes fair use.114 Judges commonly make an effort to weigh the third factor
by determining whether substantial similarities exist between the original work and the
unlicensed use.115
4.

Fourth Factor: “The Effect of Use Upon the Potential Market”

In one ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that the fourth factor is
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,”116 yet wide variations exist

112

See, e.g., Werlin v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding the
copying of two separate lines from an article “to be so fragmented as to be de minimis”); Toulmin v. RikeKumler Co., 316 F.2d 232, 232 (6th Cir. 1963); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1532, 1545 n.65 (“The idea that a de minimis copying may constitute fair use has existed for
decades and was apparently endorsed by Justice Blackmun in the Betamax case.”).
113
See Ringgold v. Black Ent., 126 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). The court reasoned that where an alleged
infringement “makes such a quantitatively insubstantial use of the copyrighted work as to fall below the
threshold required for actionable copying, it makes more sense to reject the claim on that basis and find no
infringement, rather than to undertake an elaborate fair use analysis in order to uphold a defense.” Id. See
also Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1116 n.52 (“Because copyright is a pragmatic doctrine
concerned ultimately with public benefit, under the de minimis rule negligible takings will not support a
cause of action. The justifications of the de minimis exemption, however, are quite different from those
sanctioning fair use. They should not be confused.”) (citing Funkhouser v. Loew’s, Inc., 208 F.2d 185 (8th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C.
1980); McMahon v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Greenbie v. Noble, 151
F. Supp. 45, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
114
See supra note 99.
115
“Substantial similarity” is also a threshold inquiry. Courts require the copyright holder to show a
substantial similarity between the original work and the copy to maintain a claim for copyright
infringement. The “substantial similarity” standard is usually used in that context. Some courts, however,
have, when considering the third factor, referred back to the “substantial similarity” analysis used in
determining whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257, 1271-1273 (11th Cir. 2001). Discussing the third factor, the court in Suntrust Bank stated,
“As we have already indicated in our discussion of substantial similarity, TWDG appropriates a substantial
portion of the protected elements of GWTW.” Id. at 1272.
116
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). But see Campbell, 510
U.S. at 578 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”); Leval, Fair Use
Standard, supra note 24, at 1124 (“Although the market factor is significant, the Supreme Court has
somewhat overstated its importance.”).
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in terms of defining potential markets117 and the value118 of original works. Most courts
seem to limit their examination to the “harms” posed by unlicensed uses119 without

117

See Africa, supra note 82, at 1155 (“Although the plain language of the statute, by using the word
‘potential,’ indicates that copyright law recognizes injuries to some markets that the owner has not entered,
it does not clearly state how far protection can or should extend—after all, it is hard to think of any market
that is not in some sense ‘potential.’”); Shubha Gosh, Rights of First Entry in“Derivative Markets”:
Exploring Market Definition in Copyright (paper prepared for Third Annual Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference, Aug. 8, 2003) (noting courts’ varying approaches to defining market under the fourth factor),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/IPSC_2003_Ghosh.pdf.
118
See, e.g., Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1274 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT §1305[A][4], at 181 (2001) (citing Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724
F.2d 1044 (2nd Cir. 1993)) (“The fourth factor looks to adverse impact only by reason of usurpation of the
demand for plaintiff’s work through defendant’s copying of protectible expression from such work.”);
Triangle Publications, Inc. v Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Difficulty in calculating the value of “TV Guide” left court unable to find any effect on the commercial
value of that original work) (“We are simply unable to find any effect other than possibly de minimus on
the commercial value of the copyright.”); Africa, supra note 82, at 1155 (“The ‘value of’ clause should not
be read too literally, for to do so would bar some of the prototypical fair uses. Take for instance a quotation
from a work in a scathing review—presumably, this use would affect both the value of and the potential
market for the work, because if everyone is convinced the work is bad, no one will want the work or license
its use.”).
119
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985) (“‘Fair use,
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability
of the work which is copied.’ The trial court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the
market.”) (emphasis added) (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1.10[D], at 1-87
(1984)); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (The fourth factor “requires courts
to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result
in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.”) (emphasis added) (quoting
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05[A][4], at 13 (1993)); Kelly v.
Arriba 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13562 *21 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting exact language of Campbell, supra);
Veek v. Southern Building Code Congress Int’l , Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 824 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Fourth, Veeck’s
use could have a substantially detrimental effect on the market for the copyrighted work. … There is no
genuine dispute … ‘that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting
the language from Campbell, supra); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir.
2001) (“‘Fair use … is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of
the work which is copied.’ … ‘The importance of this [fourth] factor will vary, not only with the amount of
harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other factors.’ The proof required to
demonstrate present or future market harm varies with the purpose and character of the use.”) (emphasis
added) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 n.21); Nunez v. Caribbean
Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Our inquiry … is restrained to: (i) ‘the extent of market
harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer’; and (ii) ‘whether unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse
impact on the potential market.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d
104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 154 (2d Cir.
1998) (quoting exact language of Campbell, supra); Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104,
110 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting exact language of Campbell, supra); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
137 F.3d 109, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Her only argument for actual market harm is that the defendant has
deprived her of a licensing fee by using the work as an advertisement.”) (emphasis added); Dr. Seuss
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Under this factor, we consider
both the extent of market harm caused by the publication and distribution of The Cat NOT in the Hat! and
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considering all of the market “effects”—both beneficial and harmful—as Section 107
requires.120 When the unlicensed use is commercial and non-transformative, courts tend
to put the burden of proof on accused infringers to establish that the copyright holder’s
potential market has not been harmed.121 In non-commercial and transformative
scenarios, however, the burden to show market harm122 shifts to the copyright holder.123
When analyzing that harm, courts often expand their inquiry to determine “whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the [alleged infringer] . . .
would result in a substantially adverse impact” on the market for the original work.124
The copyright holder’s potential market includes uses that substitute for125 rather
than merely complement126 the copyrighted work. As such, courts consider any harm

whether unrestricted and widespread dissemination would hurt the potential market for the original and
derivatives of The Cat in the Hat.”) (emphasis added).
120
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2003) (“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”).
121
See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567 (“[O]nce a copyright holder establishes with reasonable
probability the existence of a causal connection between the infringement [for commercial purposes] and a
loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the infringer to show that this damage would have occurred
had there been no taking of copyrighted expression.”); Dratler, supra note 70, at 321 (“If the use is
commercial, the defendant bears the burden, as is generally appropriate for an element of an affirmative
defense.”).
122
On the difficulty of proving market harm, see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567 (“Rarely will a case of
copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of actual damage.”).
123
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (“A challenge to
a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if
it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. …
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of
future harm exists.”).
124
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05[A][4], at 13-102.61 (1993)
(quoted in several cases, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Playboy
Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235
F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000); Kelly v. Arriba 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13562, * 21 (9th Cir. 2003); Castle
Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 154 (2d Cir. 1998); Infinity Broadcast Corp. v.
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)).
125
Uses that are substitutes for a copyrighted work compete directly in the same market with the original
work. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
126
See O’Rourke, supra note 82, at 1229 (“[C]ourts have used copyright fair use to excuse the
‘intermediate’ infringement that occurs in the production of a new, complementary product.”) (citing Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th
Cir. 2000)); Raymond Shih Ray Kul, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
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from a competing work to the actual or potential derivative127 markets of the copyright
holder128 but not harm to the copyright holder’s actual or potential ancillary markets.129
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished between
derivative and ancillary markets in American Geophysical Union, et al. v. Texaco Inc.,
recognizing only “traditional, reasonable, or likely developed [derivative] markets” in
determining whether the publisher suffered a market loss when Texaco researchers
photocopied journal articles.130 While the court felt that the fourth factor ultimately
favored the plaintiff, it did notinclude the plaintiff’s alleged loss in subscription revenues
in measuring market harm, holding that it was unreasonable to assume that every
photocopied article represented a lost journal purchase.131
As part of the inquiry into market harm, courts, such as the Second Circuit in
Texaco, have considered the opportunity of copyright holders to license their original
works both to the alleged infringer and to other users.132 In some circumstances,

Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 309 n.307 (2002) (“Economists define a
complementary good as a product whose fall in ‘price will cause the quantity demanded for the other
product to rise.’”) (quoting Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 49 (5th ed. 1998)).
127
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).
128
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (“The enquiry ‘must take account not only of harm to the original but
also of harm to the market for derivative works.’”) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985)); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274-1275
(11th Cir. 2001) (“An examination of the record … discloses that SunTrust focuses on the value of Gone
With the Wind and its derivatives, but fails to address and offers little evidence or argument to demonstrate
that The Wind Done Gone would supplant demand for SunTrust’s licensed derivatives.”).
129
See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 935-936 (2d Cir. 1994). An
ancillary market is the market for goods based on or related to an original work which do not compete with
the original work and are only tangentially related to the market for such work. See, e.g., United States v.
Syufy Enters., 712 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990)
(describing the ancillary markets for motion pictures which include television and home video).
130
American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930.
131
Id.
132
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“The market for potential
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license
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licensing royalties could have been realized by the copyright holder absent infringement
and litigation. However, in the vast majority of fair use cases, courts’ reliance on
potential licensing revenues to expand the scope of the copyright holder’s market is
misguided because no market exists for such licensing.133 To assume without further
analysis that an unauthorized use causes the copyright holder to lose licensing revenues
ends prematurely the fourth factor inquiry. Whether a market exists for such licenses
and, if so, the extent of such a market, is critical to the fourth factor analysis in cases
where there is a possible benefit to the copyright holder’s market from the unauthorized
use. Consequently, it is imperative first to evaluate the effect of the unlicensed use on the
copyright holder’s market apart from the possibility of unrealized licensing revenues, and
then to factor the licensing variable into the fair use equation.
Arguably, the fourth factor exerts the strongest influence on court analyses, with
many judges ruling against fair use claims when faced with potential negative effects on

others to develop.”); Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“I take as
true the claim that defendants’ products do not harm the market for Ty’s plush toys—a point that Ty does
not bother to dispute. I take as true that the defendants’ products do harm Ty’s market to license the use of
its copyrights, as it has already done with six publishers.”).
133
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 13.05 [A][4], at 13-187 (1996)
(“[A] potential market, no matter how unlikely, has always been supplanted in every fair use case, to the
extent that the defendant, by definition, has made some actual use of plaintiff’s work, which use could in
turn be defined as the relevant potential market. In other words, it is a given in every fair use case that
plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing
the very use at bar.”). See also Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 70. They note:
In an era when licensing and subsidiary rights have taken on increasing importance, the
potential market for the copyrighted work goes well beyond the sale of copies of the
work in its original form. Today, the market for derivative works is an economically
important part of the copyright owner’s market, and therefore an important part of the
incentive that drives the copyright system.
…
Too broad an interpretation of the potential market, however, presents its own dangers. If
taken to a logical extreme, the fourth factor would always weigh against fair use, since
there is always a potential market that the copyright owner could in theory license. By
definition, once the affirmative defense of fair use is invoked, there has already been a
finding of infringement. Accordingly, the defendant’s use necessarily falls within the area
of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights and therefore could have been licensed.
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markets for copyrighted materials.134 However, judges have so far been inconsistent in
cases involving potential market benefits.135 The U.S. Supreme Court has added to the
confusion regarding the application and relevance of the fourth factor in such cases by
failing to establish a consistent balance between the rights of copyright holders and the
rights of the public to use creative works.
C.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Fair Use and the Fourth Factor
The Supreme Court has considered the fair use question four times since Congress

passed the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976.136 On each occasion, the Court reanalyzed the
fair use doctrine and reset the boundaries between the economic rights of the copyright
holder and the public’s interest in accessing the copyright holder’s original works and
transformations of those works. Unfortunately, the four decisions combined have little to
offer in terms of principled and consistent interpretations of the fourth factor.
1.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.137

In this case, a television production company filed a copyright infringement suit
against the manufacturers of home videotape recorders for contributing to consumers
using the recorders to tape television programs and watch them after they had aired. In
reversing the appellate court, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the sale of VCRs did not

Id. at 687-88.
134
See supra note 109.
135
See generally supra note 5.
136
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990);
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The Supreme Court, however, has denied petitions for certiorari to
address the issue on several occasions. See, e.g., Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F.2d
1419 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., 949
F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992).
137
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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constitute contributory infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyrights.138 According to the
decision, the Court arrived at a “sensitive balancing of interests” by analyzing the four
fair use factors in the context of how consumers used the recorders.139 Based on its
interpretation of the fourth factor, the majority found that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate any likelihood of harm to the potential markets for the copyrighted works140
and, in fact, alluded to potential market increases through the practice of “timeshifting”141—that is, expanding the viewing audience of a program and the
advertisements aired during it by allowing viewers to watch pre-recorded television
programs at their convenience. The fourth factor was clearly the most important
influence in the Court’s decision.
But the Court also asserted that determinations of fair use must be based on the
facts and circumstances of individual cases142 and suggested that works with broad
secondary markets might deserve greater protection because of the increased likelihood
of commercial harm.143 The justices predicted there would be cases in which unlicensed
uses would be unfair, as the commercial harm to the copyright holder would outweigh the
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Id. at 456.
Id. at 454-55.
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Id. at 453-54.
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exact rules in the statute.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976)). The Court
was clear that it was “[a]pplying the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts as they have been
developed in this case.” Id. at 456.
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Id. at 455 n.40 (“Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such
material may well have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial
harm.”).
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public interest.144 But the Court failed to offer any specific guidance for distinguishing
between that scenario and the scenario presented in Sony.
2.

Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 145

Interestingly, the situation the Court in Sony foreshadowed was at issue in the
next fair use case the Court heard. The defendant in Harper & Row published a
magazine article containing quotations from former president Gerald Ford’s memoirs
which were being prepared for publication. Again, the Court considered all four fair use
factors in emphasizing a balance between the exclusive rights of the copyright holder to
reap financial rewards and the public’s interest in learning more about the thoughts of a
former president146—but its decision relied heavily on the fourth factor.147 Because the
copyright holder suffered a loss in revenue from not being the first to disseminate the
quotations, the Court ruled that the defendant’s use was unfair.148 According to its
decision, the use in question adversely affected the potential market for the copyrighted
work, which was not what Congress intended by “fair use” in the 1976 statute.149
However, the Court did not use this opportunity to clarify for the lower courts
how to address the economic effects of unlicensed uses of copyrighted works. Instead,
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See id. at 569 (“[The Court of Appeals] erred, as well, in overlooking the unpublished nature of the
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the Court’s fact-specific analyses in Harper & Row and Sony led to further
inconsistencies among lower courts regarding the fair use doctrine.150
3.

Stewart v. Abend151

The Stewart case goes to the heart of what benefits a copyright entails and what
protection derivatives do or do not enjoy. When MCA re-released Rear Window, a film
largely based on Cornell Woolrich’s story “It Had to be Murder,” the copyright holder of
the story152 sued for infringement. Writing for the U.S. Supreme Court majority, Justice
O’Connor rejected the user’s claim that the film, as a derivative, was a new work and
therefore protected by the fair use doctrine.153 Indeed, the court said the claim went
against the copyright laws’ express protection of derivatives.154
Before affirming the validity of the copyright, the Court examined all four fair use
factors. The justices ruled that the re-release was unfair because a) it was an
unauthorized commercial use, and therefore presumptively unfair;155 b) as a work of
fiction, the copyrighted material deserved more protection from infringement than a
factual work;156 c) a substantial portion of the copyrighted work was used in the film;157
and d) the re-release harmed the copyright holder’s ability to market new versions of the
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Woolrich had died two years before the original copyright term expired, but his executors renewed the
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Id. at 216.
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may exploit only such copyrighted literary material as he either owns or is licensed to use.’”) (quoting 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.07[A], at 3-23 to 3-24 (1989)).
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Id. at 237 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
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work.158 In contrast to its previous assertion that the fourth factor was “the most
important, and indeed, central fair use factor,”159 the Court de-emphasized the fourth
factor by stating that “common sense” led to its conclusion that the “re-release of the film
impinged on the ability to market new versions of the story.”160
The Court in Stewart overcame the case’s complicated chain of successive works
and past licenses by providing exclusive rights to the then-current copyright holder. It
allowed the copyright holderthe freedom to pursue derivative markets without analyzing
whether those markets existed and essentially ignored fourth factor influences,
particularly net market benefit in the form of the unlicensed use increasing interest in the
original story.161 The movie company invested time, labor, and capital in the re-release,
which it then lost once the re-release was deemed unfair. Consequences to the
entertainment industry from this decision have included producers obtaining all necessary
copyrights, including expectancy rights,162 before producing a movie or else risk losing
their investments when copyrights change hands.163 This new hurdle negatively affected
the public interest and private economic incentives alike as increased production costs
likely decreased the number of new productions.
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Id. at 238.
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4.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.164

In this case,165 the U.S. Supreme Court strove to balance all four fair use
factors.166 The majority ruled that the defendant’s use could qualify as fair even though a
song written and performed by 2 Live Crew had substantial similarities to the original
Roy Orbison recording.167 In its ruling, the Court emphasized that the importance of the
fourth factor varies.168 According to the Court, the fourth factor should account for “not
only . . . harm to the original, but also of harm to the market for derivative works,”169 and
then added that when determinations of market harm prove difficult, “the other fair use
factors may provide some indicia of the likely source of the harm.”170 In this particular
case, the Court found that the public interest benefits of the transformed recording were
strong, but remanded the case so thatthe trial court could weigh the un certain harm to the
copyright holder’s market.171
Interestingly, the Court failed to present anything more than a footnote on the
potential benefit to the copyright holder’s market from the unauthorized use. In that
footnote, the Court suggested that even though such use may increase the primary market
for the copyrighted work, that potential increase does not, by itself, result in fair use.172
Therefore, any market effect, such as stimulating demand for the original song, must be
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considered along with the other factors in any fair use determination.173 Despite its
previous concern for the economic impact of unlicensed use in Harper & Row and Sony,
the court refused to directly confront the issue of potential market benefit in Campbell.
The justices also offered no justification for why certain unlicensed uses should not be
considered fair per se if they enhance a copyright holder’s market.
These four decisions demonstrate the Supreme Court’s reluctance toward
developing coherent guidelines for weighing the market benefit from an unlicensed use of
copyrighted material under the fourth factor. The absence of a clear framework leaves
copyright holders and potential users in limbo, and shows the necessity for a consistent
approach to protecting both the economic incentives of artists and creators as well as the
public domain in such cases.

III.

IP THEORIES, FAIR USE, AND THE FOURTH FACTOR

Each of the four predominant theories of intellectual property—utilitarian, labor,
personality, and social planning—provide a unique perspective on reconciling the
competing interests at the core of U.S. copyright law.174 However, these theories are
ineffective as normative indicators of where courts should draw the line between fair and
unfair uses of copyrighted material. Furthermore, while it is possible to use these
theoretical perspectives to analyze cases in which an unlicensed use benefits a copyright
holder’s potential market, they do little to help establish a consistent methodology for
balancing that benefit with other factors in the fair use equation.
A.

Utilitarian Theory
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See id.
See generally William W. Fisher, III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL
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The most widely accepted of the four theories, utilitarianism encourages wealth
maximization as a means of promoting “general happiness” for the greatest number of
citizens.175 Theorists who ascribe to this model believe that courts should maximize
social welfare by balancing exclusive economic rights and incentives for the creators of
original works with public benefits accruing through the widespread use and
transformation of copyrighted material.176 Two of the leading proponents of this school
of thought, William Landes and Richard Posner, believe that artists and creators cannot
recover their “costs of expression” (i.e., time, labor, and monetary investment) when
others duplicate or copy their works without paying licensing royalties.177 When
unlicensed users fail to compensate copyright holders for these “costs of expression,”
they decrease copyright holders’ market share with their lower costs of production, which
discourages artists and authors from creating new works.178
Because maximum social welfare cannot be achieved in the absence of new
inventions and creative works, utilitarians support an approach in which artists, writers,
and inventors are granted exclusive rights to their works and inventions for a limited
period of time before the intellectual property enters the public domain.179 This approach
reflects the language in the U.S. Constitution granting Congress the power to promote
science and the arts “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
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See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 2.
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exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”180 The current debate about
the length of the copyright term illustrates how impossible it is to make a precise
determination of the extent of protection needed to maximize the artist’s or author’s
incentive to create.181
Utilitarian reasoning is frequently cited in U.S. Supreme Court decisions on
copyright infringement.182 In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,183 the Court stated that “the sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright]
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”184
More recently, the Court explained in Sony:
The monopoly privileges . . . are neither unlimited nor primarily designed
to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of
a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired . . . [T]his
task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand.185
One issue that has never been resolved by utilitarian theorists is how to quantify
or codify net social welfare. Three distinct schools of thought have emerged: the
incentive theory, the optimizing patterns of productivity theory, and the rivalrous
invention theory. The incentive theory focuses on maximizing the creation of original
works, and supporters believe maximization can be achieved only by offering creators an
180
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increased term for copyright protection.186 The optimization school of thought focuses
on disseminating information about specific consumer demands to intellectual creators
and encouraging them to respond to those demands.187 According to this perspective,
consumer welfare is maximized when consumers are getting exactly what they want.188
The invention school of thought seeks to minimize the waste occurring when a large
number of people compete to become the first creator of a work.189 Only the first creator
will obtain the copyright; therefore, the efforts of the others constitute waste.190
Disagreements over which approach best serves the interests of creators and the public
have added to the confusion over how to apply the fair use doctrine.
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1.

Utilitarian Theory and Fair Use

With its focus on maximizing social welfare, utilitarianism is both supportive of
and resistant to the fair use doctrine. The idea that the majority of fair users make some
effort to transform original works suggests that the fair use doctrine is socially beneficial,
as those who want to use an original work for larger purposes, but are not able to
overcome high transaction costs, receive protection under the fair use doctrine. It could
be argued that fair use exerts a negative impact on societal welfare by inhibiting the
widespread dissemination of copyrighted works, but without adequate protection against
imitation, artists would be discouraged from investing themselves in new works, causing
a net loss to society.191 In short, utilitarian theorists have recognized the need to balance
countervailing public and private considerations and have developed economic models in
support of this need, but so far these models have proven insufficient for helping courts
strike such a balance.192
Several other factors stand in the way of applying the utilitarian theory to fair use.
In their effort to balance creative incentives with societal benefits, utilitarian theorists
often ignore the real costs of enforcing copyrights through litigation.193 Furthermore, the
current ad hoc approach to fair use can stymie users who want to identify their rights,
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stopping potentially legitimate fair uses and negatively affecting societal welfare.194 On
the other hand, some parties may use a work unfairly and become “free-riders” if the
copyright holder cannot afford to litigate, reducing the incentive to create new works.195
Neither scenario upholds the utilitarian ideal.
2.

Utilitarianism and Market Benefits

The utilitarian model encourages a finding of fair use when an unlicensed use
benefits the copyright holder’s market in cases and there are high transaction costs to
licensing. Not only does a larger audience gain access to the artist’s or author’swork, but
the artist or author reaps financial benefits without additional effort. In circumstances
where a creator lacks the financial resources to penetrate a new market, copying can
result in significant economic rewards. But utilitarianism also touches on the concept of
laches—that is, not rewarding those who “sleep on their rights.”196 According to the
laches principle, artists and other creators who fail to enter all possible markets when
transaction costs are low should not be allowed to restrict the entrepreneurial endeavors
of others.197 In utilitarian terms, net social welfare is maximized when enterprising
individuals are rewarded at the same time that incentives for creators of original works
are preserved.198 Accordingly, if the net result of an unlicensed use is a benefit to the
copyright holder’s market, then there is no disincentive, and the use should be allowed.
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Copyright holders often refuse to offer licenses because of moral or artistic
objections rather than high transaction costs.199 They seek to protect the personal or
social values of their works, values that are disregarded in mechanical market analyses.
Copyright holders’ unwillingness to detach themselves from their works nullifies legal
reliance on licensing fee rationales. Utilitarian theorists tend to conduct fair use inquiries
in light of licensing transaction costs absent litigation, but they offer little guidance where
there is no market for a license between the copyright holder and the unlicensed user or
between the copyright holder and other users.
B.

Labor Theory
Originating from John Locke’s natural rights concept, labor theory suggests that

the state’s primary responsibility is to protect natural property rights that emerge when an
individual creates a new work from sources with no prior ownership, i.e., resources that
are “held in common.”200 Courts have drawn upon labor theory when acknowledging the
importance of rewarding artists and other creators for their labor.201 For example, in
Mazer v. Stein, Justice Reed of the U.S. Supreme Court invoked labor theory when
199
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stating, “Sacrificial days devoted to . . . creative activities deserve rewards commensurate
with the services rendered.”202 The majority in Mazer found protecting the incentives of
creators a secondary concern and held that copyrighted statuettes replicated in
manufactured lamp bases were not the type of creative works protected by U.S. copyright
law.203
The most common criticism of applying labor theory to intellectual property law
is that labor performed with a resource “held in common” does not necessarily entitle the
laborer to a property right in a work that includes the commonly-owned resource.204 This
theory also raises the difficult issue of determining which resources are truly held in
common. Generally accepted categories include facts, languages, cultural heritage, and
ideas, but problems easily arise in deciding individual cases.205 Last, defining intellectual
labor is considered an ambiguous goal, one which lacks consensus within the legal
community.206
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With an emphasis on rewarding creators for their efforts, some courts have shown
an affinity for labor theory in copyright case rulings.207 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Jeweler’s Circular Publg. Co. v. Keystone Publg. Co. relied on
labor theory in stating that “one could legally take the results of the labor and expense
which another had incurred in the publishing of his work, and thereby save himself the
expense and labor of working out and arriving at those results by some independent
road.”208 But the Court did not allow such a practice, finding that the defendant infringed
the plaintiff’s copyright on a jewelry directory.209 However, there is also ample evidence
that more recently, some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have generally
discounted labor theory.210 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.,211
the Supreme Court ruled that labor theory was inconsistent with the language of the
Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be
used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly
observed, however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory
scheme.” It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,” and a constitutional
requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor
of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”212
207
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Some scholars have questioned the legal reasoning in Feist, contending that Congress has
implicitly validated labor theory in not responding to Jewelers’ Circular Publg. Co.,213
and a number of lower courts continue to rely on labor theory principles.
1.

Labor Theory and Fair Use

At first glance, the fair use doctrine and labor theory appear in conflict. Because
labor theorists equate copyrights with rewards for creators,214 they perceive that treating
unlicensed uses as fair interferes with the natural rights of copyright holders.215 They
want to ensure copyright holders are properly compensated for their investments;
consequently, proponents of this theory argue that restricting public access to copyrighted
works is an unavoidable by-product of safeguarding natural rights.216
Labor theory and fair use principles might harmonize in cases where unlicensed
users transform original works. Parodies, criticisms, and commentaries represent an
investment of time, labor, and capital; therefore, secondary creators should arguably also
be rewarded for their contributions to the public domain. Nevertheless, the labor theory
perspective could also be used to argue that unlicensed users—unlike original creators—
are not using resources “held in common,” but resources to which the copyright holder
holds private economic rights.
2.

Labor Theory and Market Benefits
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As an absolutist principle, labor theory generally promotes the idea that creators
should receive ultimate control over their creations.217 Natural rights purists believe in
protecting the “fruits” of a creator’s labor and tend to look unfavorably on unlicensed
uses.218 But if the purpose of copyright protection is to reward creators for their
investments, any use that enhances the copyright holder’s market should be part of that
reward. The absolutist position collapses when a combination of the copyrighted and
unlicensed uses provides greater rewards to a copyright holder than the copyrighted use
alone.
C.

Personality Theory
Based on the writings of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,

personality theory supports private property rights only to the extent that they “promote
human flourishing” via the preservation of such human needs as self-expression and
personal identity.219 According to this theory, expressive or moral rights should outweigh
protecting the economic incentives of copyright holders.220 Personality theorists view
copyright law as a vehicle for protecting creators against unlicensed uses that challenge
their identities or personalities as expressed in their works. Such protections, according
to these theorists, promote a society that encourages intellectual creativity.221
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The personality theory is popular in Europe, perhaps because its moral rights
focus is compatible with the core of the European civil law system.222 Moral rights have
been largely rejected in the United States,223 but according to legal scholar Justin Hughes,
certain aspects of a creator’s personality—for instance, a painter’s artistic expression—
deserve the same protection as genetic research or other forms of labor-intensive
intellectual activities.224 Personality theorists support the view that pursuits like painting
and writing, as mental rather than physical activities, embody more of the creator’s
individuality,225 and therefore the works that result should not be treated as objects that
stand apart from their originators.226 Critics of personality theory refute the idea that
certain human needs can clearly be determined as fundamental. The challenge of
defining needs as essential or peripheral is problematic when determining what forms of
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expression deserve protection.227 Furthermore, U.S. property law emphasizes economic
rights which are hard to reconcile with personality theory.
1.

Personality Theory and Fair Use

Personality theory highlights the relationship between creators and their creations,
making societal benefits a secondary concern that are often considered irrelevant.228 In
accordance with the theory’s ultimate objective of preserving the creator’s personality,
fair uses are largely non-existent because otherwise the use of creators’ personalities
without permission would be legitimized.229 Thus, personality theorists object to the
potential distribution of artists’ and authors’ personalities in ways that they never
intended; these scholars argue that fair use removes all discretion over how expressions
of artists’ and authors’ personalities are used.230
However, personality theorists might recognize instances of fair use where the
purpose of an unlicensed use is not to replicate the copyright holder’s mode of
expression, and the nature of the copyrighted work at issue is more factual or functional
than a vehicle of personal expression.231 For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that fair use may be easier to establish for purely
factual compilations (such as news broadcasts) than for more expressive works (such as
motion pictures).232 This suggestion goes to the core of personality theory. Personality
theorists support such a notion because it gives weight to the expressive value of art.
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2.

Personality Theory and Market Benefits

Personality and moral theorists would probably consider the fourth fair use factor
largely irrelevant because they discount the economic effects of unlicensed uses.233
Instead, since they emphasize rights of creators to authorize the use of their personalities,
these theorists believe that most creators are unlikely to exchange that authority for
monetary gain.234 In the absence of economic considerations, it is highly unlikely for
personality theory to affect how courts weigh an unlicensed use’s beneficial effect on a
copyright holder’s market.
Personality theory, however, fails to address the question of how to factor moral
considerations into the fair use equation, as there is no systematic way of determining
when unlicensed uses become affronts to creators’ self-identities or personalities.
Copyright holders could use a moral defense as a guise for economic gain, especially
where there are possible market benefits from an unlicensed use. Because U.S. copyright
law includes a strong economic bias, considering market enhancement in accordance with
the constraints of personality theory would require a re-evaluation of the underlying
reasons for granting copyright protection. Consequently, the theory is perhaps more
useful for critiquing the copyright system than for analyzing individual cases that arise
under the current system.
D.

Social Planning Theory

Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1991); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§13.05[A][2] (1993); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1116).
233
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Social planning theory recognizes property rights in general and intellectual
property rights in particular when they promote the development of a just society.235
Proponents of the theory236 argue that to achieve this goal, three important changes must
be made to current copyright law: a) the copyright term must be shortened to increase the
number of works available in the public domain for creative manipulation; b) the
authority of copyright owners to control the preparation of derivative works must be
curtailed; and c) compulsory licensing systems must be created in order to balance the
interests of creators and consumers.237 The usefulness of social planning theory in
interpreting intellectual property law is severely limited when compared to the three
theories discussed above, especially because no universal definition exists for a “just and
attractive society” or the elements necessary to create such a society.238 Indeed, the
particular elements of such a society have been the subject of debates among political
philosophers for centuries.239 Even if social philosophers could agree on the definition of
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a hypothetical utopia, it would be difficult to apply that vision to the specific doctrinal
issues associated with intellectual property law.240
1.

Social Planning Theory and Fair Use

Social planning theory is consistent with fair use when a finding of fair use serves
the public interest without inhibiting production or consumption.241 Production includes
an artist’s or author’s motivation to create new works, and social planning theorists reject
a use if it affects that motivation.242 Consumption includes any effects on a copyright
holder’s potential market, and therefore social planning theorists also reject a use if it
interferes with the copyright holder expanding current markets or accessing new ones.243
The ultimate goal of social planning theory is to stimulate progress in the sciences and
arts, and therefore its supporters reject uses that discourage future artists and authors
from adding to the public domain.244 On the other hand, they support any use that
extends creative works to people who would otherwise not have access to them.245
Social planning theorists also place importance on how fair use contributes to
common community goals246—that is, the greater the connection of a work to a
community’s shared values, the greater the need for fair use to support its widespread
240

For example, consider its application to parodies. See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 36 (“[On the
one hand,] parody erodes the control over the meanings of cultural artifacts exerted by powerful institutions
and expands opportunities for creativity by others. On the other hand, parodies … may cut seriously into
the legitimate personhood interests of the artists who originally fashioned the parodied artifacts. Which of
these two concerns should predominate must be determined by reflection on the cultural context and
significance of individual cases. The social vision on its own does not provide us much guidance.”).
241
See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1565.
242
See O’Rourke, supra note 41.
243
See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1565-66.
244
Id. at 1565 (“The social functioning theories do not center around the property holder, but rather focus
on society at large. They assume that without the incentive of private property ownership, there will be no
production of property, and society will stagnate. … These theories animate the purpose commonly
supposed to be behind the copyright clause—to stimulate the progress of “Science and useful Arts.”) (citing
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1206-08 (1967)).
245
See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 33.

49

availability.247 These theorists believe that in most cases, it is possible to determine
whether a work is truly or only marginally important to a community, and thus possible
to make fair use determinations in specific cases.248 In many ways, social planning and
utilitarian theorists share a common concern in terms of balancing the rights of copyright
holders and the public interest.
2. Social Planning Theory and Market Benefits
Because this theory is more inclusive and supportive of community benefits, it
often condones (and, in some cases, encourages) uses that benefit the copyright holder’s
market.249 According to social planning theory, a commercial use that benefits an artist’s
market is also likely to benefit the public. In a non-commercial setting, when copying
meets a community’s need for education and awareness, the unlicensed user is providing
a public service.250 Social planning theorists believe that in both cases, the community
benefit outweighs the need to preserve the original artist’s exclusive rights.251
In copyright cases with a net market benefit, social planningtheory does not
appear to disparage economic motives in the way that personality theory does. Rather,
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the benefit to the copyright holder’s market combined with the public’s access to
additional works is a step toward developing a more just society. Therefore, any scenario
that provides positive outcomes for both private creators and the public should be
consistent with social planning theory.
****
The search for theoretical underpinnings to address the issue of fair use provides
much knowledge but little guidance. While proponents point to copyright scenarios
rooted in their particular ideas, the reality is that each theory has its own “ambiguities,
internal consistencies, and [a] lack of empirical information,”252 all of which prevent
theory alone from offering a concrete solution to how courts should balance the
competing rights of copyright holders and the public. Nevertheless, these theories do
illuminate key areas, such as the importance of protecting private economic rights
juxtaposed with enhancing the quality and quantity of new works accessible to the public,
which will support the fair use framework explained in this article.

IV.

MARKET ENHANCEMENT AND THE COURTS

In 1922, a U.S. district court considered the possible beneficial effects to the
copyright holder’s market from the playing of music in a movie theater (without the
copyright holder’s permission), and ruled that the possible increase in sales of the original
music was immaterial to the allegations of infringement.253 The subsequent evolution of
fair use law makes it doubtful any court today would rule the same way, but there
remains a considerable amount of inconsistency in how courts weigh the potential
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benefits to a copyright holder’s market from an unlicensed use. In this section, I will
identify patterns in the rulings of various courts which have considered market benefit,
beginning with cases in which courts did not find fair use under such circumstances and
ending with cases in which courts did.254
A.

Findings Against Fair Use
Courts have created various rationales for discounting the possible benefit to a

copyright holder’s market from an unlicensed use. According to one rationale, the loss of
licensing royalties from an unlicensed use generally outweighs the potential sales
revenues from an increased market. A second rationale is that unlicensed uses may
eliminate copyright owners’ abilities to enter new markets and license their works to
other users. In a third category of cases, courts have found unfair an unlicensed use
because the unauthorized user acted in bad faith.
1.

Preserving the Copyright Holder’s Right to License to User

Courts have repeatedly found unlicensed uses unfair where they have perceived
that the copyright holder lost (real or fictitious) opportunities to receive financial benefits
from licensing the copyrighted work to an unlicensed user. In DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel
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Fantasy, Inc.,255 Reel Fantasy named one of its comic book stores “The Batcave” and
displayed in its advertising a large number of symbols from the Batman comic book
series, which was copyrighted by DC Comics.256 DC Comics sued for copyright
infringement, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on its fair use claim. The
court stated that by using the “Batcave” name and Batman symbols without permission,
Reel Fantasy robbed DC Comics of the opportunity to license its copyrights to the comic
book store in order to earn royalties.257 According to the appellate court, even though
Reel Fantasy had advertised Batman comic books—which might have increased sales of
the plaintiff’s products—the potential market for licensing was actually decreased,258
with the copyright holder being in “the best position to balance the prospect of increased
sales against revenue from a license.”259 Ironically, the court never analyzed whether a
market for such a license existed.
The case of Iowa State U. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcast Co.,
Inc.260 presents an example of circumstances under which a market to license the
copyrighted work to an unlicensed user probably did exist. The federal district court
found—despite that the unlicensed copying possibly enhanced the copyright holder’s
market—thatthe American Broadcasting Company’s (ABC’s) use in their Olympic
255

696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
Reel Fantasy also used images of Batman and Green Arrow (another copyrighted character of DC
Comics) in its store displays.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. For an example of a court making a similar finding, see Ringgold v. Black Ent., 126 F.3d 70, 80-81
(2d Cir. 1997). When HBO used Faith Ringgold’s poster, “Church Picnic,” as a set decoration without
permission, the copyright holder argued that she was denied the opportunity to negotiate a licensing fee for
use of the poster, which she had done with other users in the past. The court, in an opinion which
referenced DC Comics, 696 F.2d at 28, found, “Even if the unauthorized use of plaintiff’s work in the
256

53

Games broadcasts of the plaintiff’s copyrighted videotape of an Olympicwrestler
violated the plaintiff’s right to license the work to ABC.261 The court also noted that
royalties would have exceeded any possible benefit to the plaintiff’s market.262 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, adding that the plaintiff’s potential
licensing revenues which could have been realized by the plaintiff were especially critical
because the defendant had a monopoly on the Olympic Games coverage.263
One court took the licensing variable a step further and defined its role as
protected the copyright holder’s choice of whether to license its work, even if it would
have chosen not to do so. In Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month Club,264 the
defendant (a shareware distribution company) provided versions of the plaintiff’s
truncated shareware to its customers. The plaintiff offered the public free access to the
same two truncated computer games via the Internet, but members of the public had to
pay a registration fee to the plaintiff if they wanted full access to the games. The
defendant claimed that by distributing the plaintiff’s truncated shareware, it increased the
demand for the plaintiff’s complete software product.265 But the plaintiff contended that
it received complaints from potential customers about both the defendant’s poor technical
support and payment of a registration fee to the plaintiff after the defendant had already
been paid, both of which, the plaintiff argued, reduced the chances that users would buy
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the complete version of the software.266 The court accepted the plaintiff’s contention,267
while shortchanging the defendant’s evidence of possible market enhancement.
In dismissing the defendant’s argument, the Illinois federal district court quoted
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. in
which the Court stated that “any copyright infringer may claim to benefit the public by
increasing public access to the copyrighted work . . . but Congress has not designed, and
we see no warrant for judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory license’ [on copyrighted
works].”268 At the heart of the district court’s decision was the belief that whether the
plaintiff would have licensed the shareware to the defendant was irrelevant as the court
only had to preserve the copyright holder’s hypothetical choice of whether to license its
shareware. Such analysis conflicts with that used by the courts in DC Comics, Inc. and
Iowa State. The courts in those cases appeared to find that the royalties they believed the
copyright holders would have earned by licensing their copyrights offset any benefit to
the copyright holders’ markets.
2.

Preserving the Copyright Holder’s Right to License to Others

In other cases, courts rejected evidence of unlicensed uses benefiting copyright
holders’ markets where copyright holders claimed that they had been deprived of
opportunities to license their works to other users.269 For instance, in Rubin v.
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Brooks/Cole Publg. Co.,270 a publisher included the plaintiff’s copyrighted “Love Scale”
(a self-test for students) in its Social Psychology textbook. The Massachusetts federal
district court expressed doubt that the defendant’s actions created a “meaningful
likelihood of harm to the current or potential markets for Rubin's existing or future
textbooks and anthologies,”271 and even went so far as suggesting that publication of the
“Love Scale” might have benefited the plaintiff’s market for the copyrighted self-test.272
Nevertheless, the court emphasized how the publisher’s unauthorized use interfered with
Rubin’s ability to obtain licensing fees from other textbook publishers, and enjoined the
publishing company from publishing additionaltext books that included the “Love Scale”
included.273 In a partial victory for the defendant (and perhaps in recognition of the
possible benefit to the plaintiff’s potential market), the court did not award any monetary
damages to the plaintiff.274
Several years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reinforced
the copyright holder’s exclusive right to license works to others. In Castle Rock Ent.,
Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc.,275 the plaintiff (a television production company) filed
suit for copyright infringement against the defendant-publishing company after the
defendant published a trivia book with questions originating from the plaintiff’s Seinfeld
television program. On appeal, the court upheld the decision of the district court (which
denied the defendant’s fair use claim), even though the appellate court admitted that the
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836 F. Supp. 909, 921-22 (D. Mass. 1993).
Id. at 921.
272
Id.
273
Id. at 925. The court weighed the possibility of such licensing royalties even though, as the court
admitted, the plaintiff had authorized other textbook publishers to publish his “Love Scale” free of charge
and there was no established market for such licenses. See id. at 922.
274
See id. at 925.
275
150 F.3d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1998).
271
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book may have increased market demand for the television program.276 The court ruled
that the plaintiff had a monopoly over the right to license or publish derivative works,
even though it had no intention of doing so.277
In two similar cases, the courts also denied fair use claims to protect the licensing
rights of copyright holders in derivative markets. In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v.
Publications Intl., Ltd.,278 the defendants published detailed plot summaries of Twin
Peaks television episodes in a book about the television show, and the copyright holder
of the Twin Peaks program sued for infringement. In denying the defendants’ fair use
claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that even though the
“appellants [including PIL, publisher of the book Welcome to Twin Peaks: A Complete
Guide to Who’s Who and What’s What,] may be correct in arguing that works like theirs
provide helpful publicity and thereby tend to confer an economic benefit on the copyright
holder, we nevertheless conclude that the book competes” with the production
company’s market interests in licensing plot summaries to other users.279
Similarly, in Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc.,280 a New
York federal district court found that an unauthorized Star Trekbook interfered with the
plaintiff's market for licensing guidebooks and other derivative works related to its Star
Trek television program. Both in Twin Peaks and Paramount Pictures, the courts
276

Id. at 146.
Id. at 145-146. In this case, the court seems to be protecting the plaintiff’s rights to develop its
derivative markets even though it had no intention of doing so. Compare Infinity Broad. Corp. v.
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying fair use claim where unlicensed user entered
derivative markets which the copyright holder had an undisputed ability and willingness to pursue);
Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 701, 708-710 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (stating,
“Where, on the other hand, the copyright holder clearly does have an interest in exploiting a licensing
market—and especially where the copyright holder has actually succeeded in doing so—it is appropriate
that potential licensing revenues for photocopying be considered in the fair use analysis.”).
278
996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993).
279
Id. at 1377.
277
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protected what they perceived as the copyright holders’ exclusive rights to license their
works to other users. In doing so, however, they begged the question of whether there
was a market for such licenses in the first place.
3.

Protecting Copyright Holders Against Unauthorized Users’ Bad-Faith Motives
The current J.K. Rowling suit against the New York Daily News likely falls within

this subcategory of fair use cases. While the author of the Harry Potter series would
most certainly not have licensed pre-release excerpts of Harry Potter and the Order of
the Phoenix to theNew York Daily News (even though pre-release publication of the
excerpts possibly increased her market for the book), the newspaper’s motives likely
militate against a finding of fair use. The newspaper had an undisputed profit motive to
copy and publish the excerpts—to sell more newspapers than it would have sold
otherwise—and presumably did so knowing of the potentialillegality of copying from a
book that had yet to be publicly disseminated. This, in combination with the damaging
effect to the plaintiff’s reputation from the publication of her work in a tabloid
newspaper,281 could influence a court to rule in Rowling’s favor.
Some courts have considered the alleged infringer’s bad-faith motives in finding a
use unfair282 even though no court has done so in the context of considering whether the
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11 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Theo Wilson, renowned criminal trial reporter, left the New York Daily News after publicly decrying the
editors as “short sighted” and “mourning the decline of a ‘world-class tabloid.’” Eric Drogin & MaryMargaret Hornsby, Book Review, Headline Justice: Inside the Courtroom – The Country’s Most
Controversial Trials by Theo Wilson, FED. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 42.
282
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1991); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited
Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118-19 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293
F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1126. Leval
considers “good faith” to be a “false factor.” Id. He finds that factoring in good or bad faith when
determining fair use “produces anomalies that conflict with the goals of copyright and adds to the
confusion surrounding the doctrine.” Id. A contract model for intellectual property, such as the one
suggested in Part VI, infra, overcomes Leval’s concern because, in contract law, the motive of the
breaching party has historically been irrelevant.
281
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use benefited the copyright holder’s market.283 Courts usually consider the unlicensed
user’s motives in connection with the first factor.284 For instance, in Tin Pan Apple, Inc.
v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., the defendants copied the appearance and sound of the rap
group Fat Boys in a beer commercial.285 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground thattheir use was fair, but the court denied the motion and found that the
defendants had likely acted in bad faith because they “had contacted plaintiffs … to
appear in such a commercial but [plaintiffs] had declined. … Subsequently defendants
put together the commercial in suit, using look-alikes of the individual plaintiffs.”286
The court concluded, “[I]t requires no effort to infer that, having been rebuffed by
plaintiffs for such a commercial, defendants Miller and Backer proceeded to copy them.
The finders of . . . fact could equate such conduct with bad faith and evasive motive on
defendants’ part.”287
The court did not find it necessary to consider all four fair use factors once it
concluded that the defendants’ use was not a parody.288 So while the court did not
consider explicitly whether the unlicensed use increased the rap group’s market for its
work, such increase was possible, which the court would have overlooked in focusing on
the motives of the alleged infringer.

283

This category is included anyway because conceivably a court could discount evidence of a benefit to a
copyright holder’s market in light of evidence that the unlicensed user acted in bad faith.
284
In Rogers v. Koons, the court described the first factor as “whether the original was copied in good faith
to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial interests of the infringer. … Knowing exploitation of
a copyrighted work for personal gain militates against a finding of fair use. And—because it is an equitable
doctrine—wrongful denial of exploitative conduct towards the work of another may bar an otherwise
legitimate fair use claim. …” 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180,
182 (2d Cir. 1981); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][1]
(1991)).
285
737 F. Supp. 826, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
286
Id. at 832.
287
Id. at 833.
288
Id. at 832.
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B.

Findings of Fair Use
In addition to sanction by Congress, legal precedent exists for findings of fair use,

especially in cases where the unlicensed use potentially benefits the copyright holder’s
market. Where such beneficial market effects exist, courts have clearly demonstrated
their acceptance of uses that: a) are transformative, b) fulfill a public purpose, or c) pass
the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. balancing test.
1.

Transformative Use Cases

Courts have regularly cited evidence of possible market enhancement289 in
supporting fair use claims where the unlicensed uses are transformative.290 Even if those
uses are part of commercial works, courts have looked favorably upon them because they

289

Although a discussion of transformative use cases in which courts conclude that there is no evidence of
market harm (but fail to consider possible market benefit) are beyond the scope of this article, courts
resolve those cases the same way. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 12741275 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a parody of Gone With the Wind, in which the author critiqued the
original work’s treatment of slaves in the pre-Civil War South, was a transformative, socially beneficial fair
use because the book did no harm to the copyright holder’s potential market). Courts talk about market
enhancement, in part, to emphasize that there is no possibility of market harm, so it is not necessarily the
case that where courts do not mention market benefit, there is no net benefit to the copyright holder’s
market. Although the court in Suntrust Bank did not say so explicitly, transformative uses, by their very
nature, increase demand for original works. See, e.g., Jackson v. Warner Bros, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585, 591
(E.D. Mich. 1997) (noting that the depiction of artist’s copyrighted paintings within a movie scene did
more to increase demand for the paintings than to hurt the artist’s market).
290
A transformative use is a use generally recognized as adding to the original, copyrighted work. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (framing question of transformative use as
“whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation or instead adds something
new”) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass 1841)); Sony, 464 U.S. at 478
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (holding that the key question as to whether defendant’s use is transformative is
whether it “result[s] in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author’s work”);
Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Co., 235 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding reproduction of controversial,
copyrighted modeling pictures in a newspaper is fair use because “it is this transformation of the works into
news—and not the mere newsworthiness of the works themselves—that weighs in favor of fair use under
the first factor of § 107”); Matthew C. Staples, Note, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
69 (2003). Making an exact copy of the original work, even if it is for educational or research purposes, is
generally not recognized as a transformative use. See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60
F.3d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that “the concept of a ‘transformative’ use would be extended
beyond recognition if it was applied to [defendant’s] copying simply because he acted in the course of
doing research”); Loren, supra note 38, at 30 (stating that courts view transformative users more favorably
because they “creat[e] new works that are adding value to society,” whereas non-transformative users are
disfavored because their uses “do not involve any transformation of the authorship elements of the preexisting work;” classroom copies are non-transformative yet fair because they are “productive”).
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enhance the public domain instead of merely superseding the original works.291 At the
same time, such uses do not undermine the economic incentives of artists and creators
because, in these circumstances, copyright holders receive more of an economic benefit
than they would have received absent the unlicensed use.292 In these cases, courts have
attempted to balance all four fair use factors, but in practice they have tended to give
greatest weight to the fourth factor.
For instance, the plaintiff in Hofheinz v. AMC Prod., Inc.293 held the copyrights to
many films produced by her late husband, James Nicholson, and sought to enjoin the
defendants from using clips of those films in a documentary about Mr. Nicholson’s
movie production company. The New York federal district court found the plaintiff was
unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claim because the defendants could successfully
avail themselves of a fair use defense.294 The court specifically emphasized the
defendants’ transformative use of the film clips295 in making a documentary to educate
the public.296 Furthermore, in reference to the fourth factor, the court commented on the
likelihood that the documentary would increase the market demand for the plaintiff’s
copyrighted works.297 This case is facially consistent with the balancing test outlined in
Campbell because the court analyzed all four fair use factors, even though the court
291

See, e.g., supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
Id.
293
147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
294
Id. at 136-37.
295
See id. at 137-38.
296
Id. (“[D]efendants’ [d]ocumentary will likely be found to be “transformative” on the trial of this matter;
it does not merely purport to supersede the original works at issue, but to create a new copyrightable
documentary. While plaintiff’s copyrighted movies aimed to entertain their audience, defendants’
[d]ocumentary aims to educate the viewing public of the impact that Arkoff and Nicholson had on the
movie industry. … The commercial nature of the [d]ocumentary, while significant, is not dispositive in
light of the [d]ocumentary’s transformative nature.”) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 584 (1994)).
292
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rested its decision on the fourth factor after determining that the defendants’ use was
transformative in that it added to rather than merely copied the copyrighted movies.298
In Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp.,299 the plaintiff-photographer sued a
newspaper for copyright infringement when the newspaper printed copyrighted
photographs of “Miss Puerto Rico” alongside articles about the public controversy
surrounding the beauty pageant winner. The Puerto Rico federal district court entered
judgment in favor of the newspaper on its fair use claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit affirmed, ruling that the transformative use of the photographs300—as
part of news articles to educate the public—offset the fact that the pictures were included
in a commercial work.301 In its reference to the fourth factor, the court stated that the
“only discernable effect [of the unlicensed use] was to increase demand”302 for the
photographer’s work. The court also noted that the relevant market was not the
photographer’s market for selling photographs generally but rather the market for selling
297

Id. at 137 (“The [d]ocumentary appears intended to add something of value rather than simply copying
the copyrighted expression that it documents. Indeed, it seems likely to stimulate a market for the original
rather than replace it.”).
298
In two similar cases, courts relied on the same considerations to find fair use. First, in Video-Cinema
Films, Inc., v. Cable News Network, the defendant aired footage of the plaintiff’s copyrighted film (The
Story of G.I. Joe) during news stories about the death of actor Robert Mitchum. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15937 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In holding that the use of the film clips was a fair use, the court stated that as to
the fourth factor, the clips do not compete with the original film, but might increase demand for the film, id.
at *30, *30 n.20, and rejected the claim that plaintiff was denied an opportunity to license uses of the film
to the defendant or to other users. Id. at *30-31.
Second, in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., the defendant wrote a biography of author Richard
Wright that included excerpts of Wright’s published and unpublished works. 953 F.3d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
The court found the defendants’ use of Wright’s works fair. Id. at 740. As to the fourth factor, the court
observed that “[i]mpairment of the market … is unlikely,” and the use may in fact stimulate interest in the
original works, thus increasing their market.” Id. at 739.
299
235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
300
Id. at 22 (“The more ‘transformative’ the new work, the less the significance of factors that weigh
against fair use, such as use of a commercial nature.”).
301
See id. at 22-23 (“[B]y using the photographs in conjunction with editorial commentary, El Vocero did
not merely ‘supersede the objects of the original creations,’ but instead used the works for ‘a further
purpose,’ giving them a new ‘meaning, or message.’”) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994)).
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or licensing the reproduced photographs.303 In addition to possible benefit to the
copyright holder’s market, the court found that since there was no potential market for
licensing the reproduced photographs to any newspaper, the photographer could not make
the claim that he had lost potential licensing fees.
2.

Per Se Cases

A number of courts have made per se findings of fair use304 in cases in which an
unlicensed use enhances the copyright holder’s potential market, regardless of the alleged
infringer’s purpose in using the copyrighted work. The per se precedent exists despite
the statutory mandate to weigh all four factors in fair use claims,305 and despite warnings
in Campbell that lower courts should not rely exclusively on the fourth factor when
making fair use determinations.306
a.

Public Use307

302

Id. at 25 (citing Amsinck v. Colum. Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 212-14 (D. Mass. 1986)).
303
Id. at 24 (“[W]e should limit our analysis to the effect of the copying on the market for the reproduced
photographs. The overall impact to Nunez’s business is irrelevant to a finding of fair use.”).
304
As early as 1965, a court focused exclusively on the fourth fair use factor in noting that defendants
would have prevailed on its fair use claim had plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement. See
Mura v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D.C.N.Y. 1965). The defendants used the
plaintiff’s copyrighted hand puppets on their television show, and the court found that there was no
copyright infringement because such use did not fit the definition of “copying.” Id. at 589. But the court
went on to consider the fair use question anyway and found that had infringement occurred, defendants’ use
was fair because, if anything, the defendants increased sales of plaintiff’s puppets as defendants’ use of the
puppets did not substitute for the plaintiff’s sales. Id. at 589. The court made its finding without
considering other factors. Id.
305
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2003) (stating, “In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include,” the four factors listed within the
statute); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (interpreting
the House Report on § 107 as “expressly stat[ing] that the fair use doctrine is an ‘equitable rule of reason,’”
and Senate Committee Reports as finding “while not conclusive with respect to fair use, [the fourth factor]
can and should be weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions.”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (interpreting § 107 as requiring the consideration of all four
factors because “[t]he statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright Act reflects the
intent of Congress to codify the common law doctrine,” and thus it “requires a case-by-case determination
whether a particular use is fair, and the statute notes four nonexclusive factors to be considered.”).
306
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
307
A public use is one that furthers a governmental purpose such as education, public adjudication or
criminal justice. See Part V, infra. Transformative uses, by their very nature, are public uses because they
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In a post-Campbell decision,308 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
relied exclusively on the fourth factor in determining thatthe defendant’s use of the
plaintiff’s copyrighted games during a children’s gaming tournament would have
constituted fair use had there been a prima facie case of infringement. The court
reiterated that Section 107 of the Copyright Act “allows the fair use of a copyrighted
work in such instances as for nonprofit educational purposes and where the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the protected work is limited.”309 The court
then noted that the “potential market for the subject games has in all likelihood increased
because participants of the [gaming] tournament have had to purchase Allen’s games.”310
Resting its decision on the fourth factor, the court made only a fleeting reference to the
first three factors.311 The court stated, “Analysis of other factors involved in § 107 leads
this court to conclude that the application of the fair use doctrine in this case is clearly
appropriate.”312 Even though the defendant’s use was not transformative, the court would
have allowed it had there been copying because it served the public purpose of education.
b.

Private Use313

enhance the arts. The author believes that the dichotomy between commercial and non-commercial uses is
over-emphasized. Some courts agree. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d
Cir. 1998) (“We also note that the district court placed little or no emphasis on the commercial nature of
Dial-Up. We agree that, notwithstanding its mention in the text of the statute, commerciality has only
limited usefulness to a fair use inquiry; most secondary uses of copyrighted material, including nearly all of
the uses listed in the statutory preamble, are commercial. As the Supreme Court observed in Campbell, to
give commerciality a ‘presumptive force against a finding of fairness,’ would render the preamble a
nullity.”) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584) (citing Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publg.
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1998); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913,
921 (2d Cir. 1994))
308
Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1996).
309
Id. at 617.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
A private use is a use that is non-transformative and does not promote a governmental purpose,
including many religious and some commercial uses. See Part V, infra.
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The court’s decision in Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc.314 illustrates the per se
approach in a case where the unlicensed use was private. The copyright holder of two
surrealistic (fine art) photographs initiated a lawsuit against Hustler Magazine for
publishing images of commercially available postcards of the photographs. Although the
opinion included a discussion of the first three factors, the court apparently dismissed the
magazine’s profit motive and relied on the fact that the postcards were publicly
disseminated to negate the need to protect the artist’s private economic rights.315 The
court held that the plaintiff’s case “fatally falter[ed]” on the fourth fair use factor because
the defendant’s use of the postcards had no effect on the sale, licensing, or exhibition of
the plaintiff’s photographs.316 Perhaps more significantly, the court emphasized that
postcard sales of the two copyrighted works increased after their publication in Hustler
Magazine,317 evidence that sealed the defendant’s fair use defense.
The court recognized that the defendant sold Hustler Magazine for profit, which
normally would have militated against fair use.318 However, the court also agreed with
the magazine’s claim that it published the two postcards with commentary to entertain
rather than to sell magazines.319 That distinction is a fiction because the defendant
published Hustler Magazine to entertain its readers only in order to sell magazines.
Similarly, when analyzing the nature of the copyrighted work, the court found that the
314

626 F. Supp. 201, 212-214 (D. Mass. 1986). For more analysis of this case, see E. Kenly Ames, Note,
Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1473, 1492-93
(1993) (discussing the fair use analysis in Haberman); Sara T. Murphy, Comment, Copyright Law—First
Circuit Countermands Photographer’s Copyright in Favor of Fair Use—Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News
Corp., 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 689, 692 n.30, 695 n.57, n.58 (2001) (same).
315
See Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 210-211.
316
Id. at 212.
317
Id.
318
Id. at 210.
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photographs deserved heightened protection because they were “creative, imaginative,
and original”320 and “represent[ed] a substantial investment of time and labor in
anticipation of a financial return.”321 Nevertheless, the court went on to discount the
nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works because they had been made public in the
form of postcards—an ironic twist in light of the court’s emphasis on the limited
dissemination of the images.322 The court appears to have made its decision purely on the
positive market benefits of the unlicensed use, without giving credence to other factors
that might have weighed against a fair use finding.323
3.

Courts Using a Balancing Test

In the landmark case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,324 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the extent to which an alleged infringer enhances the potential market for
a copyrighted work must be measured in terms of degree and then balanced against the
other three fair use factors.325 In stating that the benefit to a copyright holder’s market is
only one variable in measuring fair use, the Court described a process of weighing all
four fair use factors in a “sensitive balancing of interests.”326 The majority stated that
319

Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 211. Further, entertainment is not one of the permissible purposes for fair
use listed in the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003). While that list is not all-inclusive, the court offers
no justification for why copying intended to entertain, absent anything else, is not exploitative.
320
Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 211.
321
Id.
322
See id.
323
This is similar to the reasoning employed in Amsinck v. Colum. Pictures Indus., where the court, in
dicta, rejected a balancing approach to fair use and advocated a per se rule in cases where there was no
harm from the unlicensed use and possible benefit to the copyright holder’s market. 862 F. Supp. 1044,
1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
324
510 U.S. 569, 590-91 (1994).
325
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91. Courts in other cases made similar analyses. See, e.g., Lish v.
Harper’s Mag. Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that without harm to the
copyright holder’s potential market, it is likely that the fair use doctrine would not apply; however, the
other factors must still be considered); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991)
(balancing the four factors weighs in favor of fair use in the case of a biographer’s unauthorized use of
private letters).
326
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455
n.40 (1984)).
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“[m]arket harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not only
with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other
factors.”327 Lower courts have adopted the Campbell balancing test in this way.
a.

Public Use
In a recent decision, Bond v. Blum,328 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit applied the Campbell balancing test to the defendants’ fair use claim made in
response to charges that copying a manuscript for use in a child custody case violated the
plaintiff’s copyright in the manuscript. Mr. Slavin and the law firm representing him
introduced into evidence a book written by his former wife’s current husband entitled
Self- Portrait of a Patricide: How I Got Away with Murder. The court found defendants’
use fair.329 While recognizing that defendants’ verbatim copying of the entire
manuscript militated against fair use under the third factor,330 the court emphasized that
the defendants introduced the manuscript for its evidentiary value and not for its mode of
expression.331 As to the market effect of the unlicensed use, the court, quoting the district
court, stated, "Ironically, if anything, [the defendants' use] increases the value of the work
in a perverse way, but it certainly doesn't decrease it."332 In balancing the four factors,
the court relied heavily on the public nature of the unauthorized use, noting that “the
public has an interest in retaining in the public domain ‘the right to discover facts’”—
especially those facts constituting evidence in a judicial proceeding.333
b.
327
328
329
330
331
332

Private Motivation

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
317 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 396-7 (citations omitted).
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In Jackson v. Warner Bros. Inc.,334 the producers of Made in America used
artwork by an African-American artist as part of the set for their movie without obtaining
the artist’s permission. The plaintiff thought that the movie’s depiction of AfricanAmericans was “culturally exploitative” and sued for copyright infringement.335 The
court found the defendant’s use fair after balancing all four fair use factors and finding
that only the second factor favored the plaintiff.336 The Michigan federal district court
quoted Campbell in response to the defendant’s evidence that its use increased the sale of
the plaintiff’s artwork—“that favorable evidence without more is no guarantee of
fairness.”337 But interestingly, after noting that the defendant did not meet its burden
under Campbell to show absence of market harm, the court went on to find that Campbell
was distinguishable.338

According to the district court, in Campbell, there was evidence

of substantial harm to a derivative market, and harm to the original market (as in
Jackson) was not at issue.339 The court then gave substantial weight to the fourth factor
and concluded that there was no showing that the defendant’s use harmed the market for
the copyright holder’s art and that the factor therefore favored the defendant. 340
333

Id. at 394 (quoting Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th
Cir. 1996)).
334
993 F. Supp. 585, 591-592 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
335
Id. at 587.
336
Id. at 585.
337
Id. at 591.
338
Id.
339
Id.
340
Id. The court relied on the four factors as set out by the court in Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In that case, the court considered, “1) whether the use
tends to interfere with sales of the copyrighted article; 2) whether the challenged use adversely affects the
potential market for the copyrighted work; 3) whether the ‘copying’ can be used as a substitute for
plaintiff's original work; and, 4) whether the copyright owner suffers demonstrable harm.” Id. In Amsinck,
the plaintiff’s work, a mobile, appeared in the defendant’s film for a total of one minute and thirty-six
seconds. Id. at 1045-46. The court described the fourth factor as “whether the use tends to interfere with
sales of the copyrighted article. … While the mere absence of measurable pecuniary damages does not
require a finding of fair use, the less adverse the effect that the alleged infringing has on a copyright
owner’s expectations of financial gain, the less public benefit need be shown to justify the use.” Id. at 104849.
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Similarly, in Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., the court balanced the
fair use factors to conclude that despite defendants’ purely private use of an
advertisement parody for fundraising purposes, the unauthorized use was fair.341 In 1983,
Hustler Magazine published an ad parody featuring Reverend Jerry Falwell. Soon after
publication, Falwell included copies of the ad parody in his fundraising literature and
commercials. HustlerMagazine sued Falwell and his religious organizations for
copyright infringement and the defendants claimed fair use.342 The court found that
despite the defendants’ commercial use of the parody, it was “consistent with
congressional intent to find that Falwell was entitled to provide his followers with copies
of the parody in order effectively to give his views of the derogatory statements it
contained.”343 The fourth factor also favored the defendants, with the court noting, “In
fact Hustler republished the same parody in its March, 1984 issue, indicating that if
anything plaintiff thought the market for the parody had increased.”344
***
The attempt to categorize the cases discussed in this section reveals some
common trends, but perhaps does more to reveal inconsistencies in how courts approach
the fair use doctrine. From these commonalities and differences emerges a framework
for evaluating fair use in cases in which the unlicensed use possibly benefits the
copyright holder’s market.
V.

A FAIR USE FRAMEWORK AND THE FOURTH FACTOR

The gaps in U.S. copyright law are increasing in step with changes in technology

341
342
343
344

Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1539-1540 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
Id. at 1529.
Id. at 1535.
Id. at 1540.
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(e.g., innovative media, enhanced means of duplicating copyrighted works, and new
avenues of expression), which are giving rise to unpredictable conflicts between private
property rights and the public interest.345 Despite the most recent call by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Campbell to balance all four fair use factors,346 courts continue to
emphasize the fourth factor most heavily—the market effects (and, most often, the
market harm) from the unlicensed use of copyrighted works.347 In cases where an
unlicensed use benefits or has no effect on the copyright holder’s potential market,
striking a balance between the private economic rights of creators and the public’s access
to creative works is easiest. In such cases, courts should protect transformative or public
uses as fair, and not necessarily protect uses that are both non-transformative and private.
However, in the latter scenario, the copyright holder, if successful in litigation, should be
limited to injunctive relief, or where injunctive relief would prove ineffective, statutory or
other monetary damages should be offset by the benefit to the copyright holder’s market.
This framework demands that courts account for a copyright holder’s lost
licensing royalties in its analysis of market effect only if a primary or derivative market
345

See, e.g., Kul, supra note 126, at 264 (“Digital technology therefore has ‘the potential to demolish a
careful balancing of public good and private interest that has emerged from the evolution of U.S.
intellectual property law over the past 200 years.’”) (quoting COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (National Academy 2000)).
346
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“Nor may the four statutory factors be
treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of
the purposes of copyright.”).
347
See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (“This factor is ‘undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use.’”) (quoting Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985)); Sony Computer Ent. v. Bleem, 214 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In addressing this fourth and
most important factor, the Supreme Court considered…”); Sundeman v. Seajay Socy., 142 F.3d 194, 20607 (4th Cir. 1998) (“This fourth factor ‘is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.’”)
(quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99
F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (“In determining whether a use is ‘fair,’ the Supreme Court has said that the
most important factor is the fourth … We take it that this factor … is at least primus inter pares,
figuratively speaking, and we shall turn to it first.”); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11826, *24 (D. Md. 2003) (“This factor is ‘undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use.’”) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566).
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for licensing the original work exists, and only if the copyright holder is willing and able
to exploit that market. Where such markets do not exist, licensing royalties are not part
of the copyright holder’s expectation interest348 in the copyright, so courts should not
factor in unrealized royalties into their analysis of the copyright holder’s market.349 To
do so does nothing further to protect the incentives of artists and authors to create new
works.
A.

Removing the Emphasis on Licensing Rationales
Many courts reject fair use claims to protect the right of copyright holders to

choose between the benefits of an expanded market and the opportunity to realize
royalties by licensing their original works to other users.350 This approach has two
348

An “expectation interest” is a traditional contract law concept used in calculating damages for breach of
contract. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1982); E. Allen Farnsworth,
Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J.
1339, 1341 (1985) (“[I]t is a principle of the law of contracts that damages for breach should be based on
the injured party’s lost expectation.”) (citing U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978)); Robert Cooter & Melvin
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1985) (“The conventional
analysis of contracts holds that the purpose of damages is to compensate the victim of breach for his injury.
This purpose, in turn, is normally to be accomplished by awarding expectation damages—that is, the
amount required to put the injured party where he would have been if the contract had been performed.
The goal, compensation, and the means, expectation damages, are so ingrained in contract law as to seem
self-evident.”); Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Anderson, The World of a Contract, 75 IOWA L. REV. 861, 865
(1990) (“The expectation interest defines the harm that is the distinctive (though not the sole) concern of
contract law. Compensation for harm to the expectation interest is well recognized as the prime goal of the
main judicial remedies for breach of contract.”). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines the
“expectation interest” as the promisee’s “interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as
good a position as he would have been had the contract been performed.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1982). In determining the position of the plaintiff but for the breach (or in the case
of copyright, the infringement), the law has required that the expectation interest be forseeable and shown
with sufficient certainty. See id. at cmt. b, §§ 351, 352. Similarly, the forseeability and certainty
requirement for measuring expectancy interests would most likely bar recovery for lost licensing revenues
in a previously nonexistent licensing market.
349
A copyright holder’s expectation in a copyright is the economic value of the copyright to the creator at
the time the original work is created. Current copyright law, in different ways, enables copyright holders to
receive more than their expectation interest upon infringement. For example, the law entitles copyright
holders to an infringer’s profits (disgorgement) from an unlicensed use, see supra note 42, even though the
copyright holder did not expect infringement at the time of creation. Likewise, licensing revenues that the
copyright holder never intended to realize are outside of the copyright holder’s expectation. As discussed
in Part V-C and Part VI, infra, perhaps using an expectancy measure for calculating damages in copyright
infringement cases is most consistent with the predominant utilitarian theory of intellectual property and
best balances private economic rights and the public interest.
350
See, e.g., Part IV-A and Part IV-B, supra.
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potential pitfalls. First, these courts often assume copyright holders and unlicensed users
(and copyright holders and other users) can enter into licensing agreements with minimal
transaction costs. If transaction costs are too high, or, as is often the case, the copyright
holder is simply unwilling to license an original work or no market exists for such a
license, then courts should not protect the copyright holder’s right to license because the
copyright holder has no expectation of realizing licensing revenues. Therefore, any
judicial fair use inquiry should start with a determination as to whether a market for
licensing the original work exists.
Second, through their focus on potential licensing revenues, courts are doing more
than simply preserving the rights of copyright holders to control the dissemination of
their works. Even where a market for licensing original works existed, copyright holders
reap the market benefit of an unlicensed use and—under a statutory or compensatory
measure of damages—receive damages for that use. To more accurately preserve the
rights of copyright holders to license their works and to not give artists and authors an
over-incentive to create, courts should offset the value of any market benefit to the
copyright holder against whatever monetary damages would otherwise have been
awarded.
Several cases reflect these pitfalls inherent in trying to protect the rights of
copyright holders to license their works to unlicensed users. For example, in DC Comics,
Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc.,351 the appellate court did not find the comic book store’s
appropriation of the plaintiff’s copyrights fair as a matter of law because the defendant
precluded DC Comics from licensing the Batman name and symbols to the comic book
store. But the court failed to define the factual issues for the lower court to consider on
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remand—most notably, whether the copyright holder would have licensed its copyrights
to the comic book store absent litigation and whether it could have done so without high
transaction costs. If a license were improbable, the court should have directed the trial
court not to factor lost licensing royalties into its market analysis upon remand.
In Iowa State U. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcast Co., Inc., 352 the
court looked more closely at the plaintiff’s ability and willingness to license its videotape
of an Olympic wrestler to the defendant and made an apparent assumption (which was
never proven) that the plaintiff could have and would have licensed the copyrighted
videotape to the defendant absent infringement and litigation. If the court was correct in
its assumption, then it decided the fair use inquiry correctly because the plaintiff’s
licensing royalties would most likely have exceeded any other market benefit to the
copyright holder from the unlicensed use (especially because the defendant had a
monopoly on the Olympic Games coverage). However, the monetary value of any
proven market benefit to the copyright holder should have been subtracted from the
plaintiff’s damages, an omission that defeated the court’s purpose in preserving the
copyright holder’s choice between attempting to exploit the market for licensing its
videotape on the one hand, and withholding consent for any such license and reaping the
benefits of an enhanced market on the other.353
In Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month Club, 354 the court found defendant’s
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696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).
353
See id. If Iowa State had granted ABC a non-exclusive license to use the videotape, then Iowa State
could theoretically have received licensing royalties from ABC and reaped the benefits of an enhanced
market. However, such a result was implausible as ABC did not even seek Iowa State’s permission to use
the videotape. Additionally, if the parties had negotiated a licensing agreement, the parties would have
negotiated a royalty rate that accounted for the possibility of market benefit (as an economic benefit to the
transaction), something that courts seem unwilling to account for in awarding damages.
354
13 F. Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
352
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shareware versions of the plaintiff’s copyrighted software unfair because to find
otherwise, would have required the court to impose a compulsory license on the
copyright holder. The court in this case found the question irrelevant of whether a market
existed for a license between the plaintiff and the defendant. Regardless of the net effect
of the unlicensed use on the plaintiff’s potential market, the court paradoxically
suggested that copyright holders should have their licensing rights protected even when
no such license is possible.355 Such protection seems unrelated to protecting artists’ and
authors’ incentives to create because a copyright holder does not expect to reap market
benefits and realize licensing royalties when no market for a license exists.
Decisions protecting copyright holders’ rights to license works to users other than
alleged infringers raise the same issue as to whether a plausible market for licensing
exists. In Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publg. Co.,356 the court rejected the defendant’s fair use
claim because the defendant-publisher’s unlicensed use might have affected the
plaintiff’s ability to license the “Love Scale” to other textbook publishers in the future. In
reaching that conclusion, the court’s fourth factor analysis was skewed. While noting the
absence of evidence that the defendant harmed the plaintiff’s potential market and
speculating that the unlicensed use might have increased demand for the copyrighted
“Love Scale” in question, the court nevertheless ruled in favor of the plaintiff.357 The
decision overlooked two critical facts that made the existence of such a market for
licensing implausible: a) other textbook authors had used the same copyrighted work
355

See id. at 790-91. But see American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-30 (2d Cir.
1994) (“However, not every effect on potential licensing revenues enters the analysis under the fourth
factor. Specifically, courts have recognized limits on the concept of “potential licensing revenues” by
considering only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets when examining and assessing a
secondary use’s ‘effect upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’”).
356
836 F. Supp. 909, 920-22 (D. Mass. 1993).
357
Id. at 922.
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without paying royalties, including many who had received prior permission to do so; and
b) the plaintiff offered no proof that a market for licensing the “Love Scale” to other
users existed.358 The court was able to avoid drawing any conclusions about the net
effect of the unlicensed use on the copyright holder’s potential market by making an
unprincipled decision that reflected the compromise in its analysis—the court entered an
injunction to enjoin future use by the defendant but did not award the plaintiff damages
for the defendant’s past use of the “Love Scale.”359
In Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 360 a decision resembling the
dicta in Storm Impact, Inc., the court found the dissemination of the defendant’s Seinfeld
trivia book unfair, holding that Castle Rock (the producer of the Seinfeld television
program) had exclusive rights to derivative works regardless of whether it intended to
enter the markets for those works. In this case, the plaintiff could not demonstrate any
harm to its potential derivative markets because it had no desire to exploit those
markets.361 Even though the court recognized that the defendant’s use was
transformative, it ruled that the degree of transformation was not enough to support a fair
use finding.362 However, in light of the fact that the only possible effect of the use on the
plaintiff’s market was beneficial, even a slight degree of transformation should have been
enough to support a finding of fair use.
Likewise, in Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Intl., Ltd.,363 the copyright
holder had once showed an interest in exploiting derivative markets, yet admitted that its
358

See id. (“In spite of these shortcomings, however, the Court is inclined to infer that at least some market
exists for licensing the Love Scale to other textbook authors.”).
359
Id.
360
50 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1998).
361
Id.
362
Id. at 143.
363
996 F.2d 1366 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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interest in those markets decreased as the popularity of Twin Peaks diminished. 364

The

court gave greater weight to the plaintiff’s passive interests in market development than
to the economic benefit from the defendant’s unlicensed use, and did not consider
whether a market for licensing the original work for derivative uses existed.365 Whether
correct, the court, as in other cases, made no suggestion that the value of the benefit to the
plaintiff’s market should have been subtracted from any damages that otherwise would
have been awarded to the plaintiff. 366 The court ignored the economic realities of the
copyright holder’s market as is characteristic of courts in fair use cases.
B.

Two-Part Framework
Eliminating reliance on the copyright holder’s lost licensing royalties when no

market for such licensing exists is the necessary first step to assessing any net market
benefit from an unlicensed use. Only when a market for such licensingexists, and the
copyright holder is able and willing to exploit that market, should lost licensing royalties
be considered in measuring the effects of the unlicensed use on the copyright holder’s
market.
With the licensing obstacle aside, courts should apply a relatively simple rubric in
fair use cases where there exists a possible benefit (or, at minimum, there is no market
harm) to the copyright holder’s market from the unlicensed use. In such cases,
transformative and other public uses would be fair, while non-transformative and nonprivate uses would be presumptively unfair, but damages in the latter scenario would be
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Id. at 1377.
Id.
366
See id. See also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
365
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limited when the copyright holder is successful in litigation.367
While this approach rejects the importance thatsome courts placeon the
commercial/non-commercial dichotomy,368 that dichotomy is not very effective in
helping to draw the line between fair and unfair uses.369 As courts have defined the
inquiry, the question is not whether the unlicensed use is part of a commercial work, but
whether the unlicensed user has exploited the original work for commercial gain.370 Such
inquiry is often a fiction because almost any unlicensed use in a commercial work is, in
part, for commercial gain even if there are other purposes for the use as well.371 The
murkiness of the test gives courts great latitude in categorizing uses as either commercial
or non-commercial in fair use cases.
The grant of exclusive rights to creators and the statutory limitations on those
rights were both enacted for the benefit of the public.372 The dichotomy between
commercial and non-commercial uses avoids the question of whether an unlicensed use is
consistent with the public purpose of U.S. copyright law. Transformative uses, even if
undertaken for commercial purposes, add new works to the public domain.373
367

One of the primary objections to this framework is the speculative nature of measuring market benefit
or finding the absence of any market harm. However, evaluating market harm under the fourth fair use
factor and calculating copyright damages are equally as subjective and speculative. The fourth factor is a
difficult criterion for measuring justice, yet it is a crucial guideline for determining fair use in a justice
system based on economic rather than moral rights.
368
See supra notes 84-87, 121, 123 and accompanying text.
369
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
370
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
371
See, e.g., Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 212-214 (D. Mass. 1986); see also supra
notes 318-321 and accompanying text.
372
See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (“the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward.”). Determining fair use “involves a
difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand.” Id.
373
An obvious example would be a critical book review printed in a newspaper or magazine.
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Conversely, some non-commercial uses, such as the videotaping of television programs
for personal use, do not fulfill any public purpose.374 Therefore, with a commercial/noncommercial dichotomy, even after an unlicensed use is categorized, the critical inquiry of
whether the use is in furtherance of a public purpose remains.
Therefore, a more useful dichotomy is between public and private uses, a
distinction helpful in analyzing whether unlicensed uses are consistent with the public
purpose of copyright law. Public uses include transformative uses (which further the
objective of U.S. copyright law to add new works to the public domain), but also include
non-transformative uses satisfying other governmental objectives such as education and
public adjudication. The use of copyrighted games in an educational children’s gaming
tournament (Allen v. Academic Games) and the introduction of a copyrighted manuscript
into evidence at a custody hearing (Bond v. Blum) are both public uses.
Private uses do not fulfill a governmental purpose.375 Private uses may include
copying for the purposes of advertising, such as calling one’s comic book store “The
Batcave,” (DC Comics v. Reel Fantasy) or a religious organization’s use of an
advertisement parody in fundraising literature (Hustler Magazine. v. Moral Majority),

374

See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax
Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1521-22 (1982) (“The Betamax court of appeals properly found that fair use is
not applicable where the user copies a protected work merely for his own ‘convenience’ or ‘entertainment.’
Yet it is an ‘entertainment’ use, and only that, which is involved in most audio home recording. It cannot
be said that the purpose and character of home recording meets the first requirement of fair use.”).
375
Private uses include those similar to what Justice Blackmun described as “purely personal
consumption” in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 495 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun explained that “[i]t is clear, however, that personal use of programs that
have been copied without permission is not what 107(1) protects. The intent of the section is to encourage
users to engage in activities the primary benefit of which accrues to others. Time-shifting involves no such
humanitarian impulse. … Purely consumptive uses are certainly not what the fair use doctrine was designed
to protect, and the awkwardness of applying the statutory language to time-shifting only makes clearer that
fair use was designed to protect only uses that are productive.” Id. at 496.
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uses that, on their face, do not further any public purpose.376 Yet another possible private
use is downloading (essentially copying a copy) an MP3 music file for one’s own
personal music collection. This public/private use dichotomy is instructive to the twopart framework discussed below.
1.

Market enhancement + transformative or public use = fair use

Judicial guidelines require a clear understanding of the purpose of copyright law.
One motivation for granting copyright protection is to preserve an artist’s or author’s
incentive to create; the counterbalance is the desire to augment the public domain. When
there is a possible net benefit (or, at minimum, an absence of any harm) to the copyright
holder’s market from an unlicensed use, a finding of fair use protects the economic
expectancies of copyright holders without undermining the incentive to create.
Likewise, where the unlicensed use is transformative or public, the user has added to the
quality and quantity of original works available to the public or fulfilled some other
public purpose. In a legal system adverse to moral rights, a finding of fair use under
these circumstances strikes the balance that many theorists and judges seek between
private property rights and the public interest. The competing goals—the copyright
holder’s expectations of protection for resource investment and financial reward as well
as the public’s interest in having access to an ever-increasing number of creative works—
are both fulfilled when transformative or public uses that do not harm the copyright
holder’s market are found to be fair.377

376

While advertising and fundraising can indirectly make an original work accessible to more people, the
connection is weak because in most cases, the public would already have had access to the original work
before the advertising or fundraising occurred.
377
See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d
18 (1st Cir. 2000); Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc, 89 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1996); Hofheinz v.
AMC Prod., Inc. 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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2.

Market Enhancement + non-transformative and private use = if no fair use, then
limitations on damages
In cases where there is a net benefit (or an absence of any harm) to the copyright

holder’s market from a non-transformative and private use, a finding of fair use is
consistent with protecting the copyright holder’s expectancy and the incentive to create.
But in these cases, there is no strong countervailing public interest furthered by the
unlicensed use.378 Consequently, a finding of fair use is not necessary to balance the
economic rights of the copyright holder and the public interest, and most of what is at
stake are competing private interests.

Consequently, courts should presume that such

unlicensed uses are unfair, and in most, if not all, cases, find that the private motives of
the unlicensed user do not provide a sufficient justification for fair use.
However, at the same time, the law should not provide copyright holders
economic rewards (in the form of damages) beyond their expectation interests. Many
courts have allowed copyright holders to collect damages and reap the benefits of an
enhanced market379—a double-reward process that exceeds the incentives that copyright
law was designed to protect. In these cases, because the copyright holder is benefiting
economically or, at minimum, suffering no harm, there must be some moral or social
objection to the unlicensed use. Without a moral or social objection, there would be no
litigation, as is the casewith the comic book market in Japan.

Therefore, the preferred

remedy in cases of non-economic harm to copyright holders should be an injunction380
but only if injunctory relief prevents the unlicensed use. In cases where injunctions
would be futile (e.g., to prevent the publication of pre-release excerpts of J. K. Rowling’s

378

See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
See generally Part IV-A, supra.
380
A court would also have to award the copyright holder attorneys’ fees and costs to protect fully the
copyright holder’s expectancy in the copyright.
379
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latest book), the value of any benefit to the copyright holder’s market should offset
statutory or other compensatory damage awards.381 The copyright holder should not reap
damages from infringement as well as the benefits of infringement at the same time.
In certain other situations, U.S. copyright law allows for multiple recoveries—for
instance, the copyright holder who recovers lost profits plus the unlicensed user’s profits
(disgorgement), or the copyright holder who receives treble damages in certain cases of
willful infringement.382 “Double recovery” in copyright cases has come under
considerable scrutiny.383 Most critics have focused on the potential for the copyright
holder’s monetary recovery to exceed the actual damages from the unlicensed use,
especially in cases where courts seek to disgorge the profits of the unlicensed user
attributable to the infringement.384 A model of awarding economic damages equal to the
copyright holder’s expectation interest, in cases of market benefit and in infringement
cases more generally, precludes the need for courts to make subjective, fact-specific
inquiries into an unlicensed user’s motives, and prevents an unnecessary chilling effect

381

In cases where there is no economic harm to the copyright holder’s market from the unlicensed use, and
the copyright holder prevails, the copyright holder’s economic expectancy can be realized by an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs alone. But copyright holders also have an expectancy, although non-economic, in
protection from certain unlicensed uses, and awards of statutory damages (to the extent that those damages
exceed the value of any market benefit) might be necessary to deter private, unlicensed uses of original
works.
382
See supra note 42 (discussing methods of calculating damages for copyright infringement under the
Copyright Act); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(d) (2003).
383
See, e.g., Andrew W. Coleman, Copyright Damages and the Value of the Infringing Use: Restitutionary
Recovery in Copyright Infringement Actions, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 91, 92-93 (1993) (“[A] copyright owner is
entitled to recover both actual damages and any profits of the infringer. … ‘Damages are awarded to
compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and profits are awarded to prevent the
infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 66 (1976); Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 32-33 (1999)
(“[T]he Copyright Act potentially permits owners to recover amounts far in excess of their actual losses.
Take for example a songwriter whose copyright in a previously-distributed musical work has been
infringed, albeit innocently, by a recording artist. Although the songwriter may have suffered only the loss
of a statutory royalty, he nonetheless may recover all profits of the recording artist attributable to the
musical work—without regard to the fact that such profits may far exceed the amount that the songwriter
would have received had the infringer obtained a license ex ante.”).
384
Id.
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on those who seek to transform or use original works legally but do not do so out of fear
of the restitutionary or punitive nature of copyright damages. As copyright law is a
difficult balancing act, invoking restitution or punishment adds another equitable variable
into fair use inquiries and leaves little room for error.
C.

Aligning the Framework with Intellectual Property Theories
The framework just described is arguably most consistent with utilitarianism, the

predominant theory of intellectual property.385 The current U.S. copyright system rests
on primarily utilitarian principles, and the proposed framework fulfills utilitarian
objectives in protecting the economic incentives of creators, recognizing the economic
realities of licensing, encouraging the use of copyrighted works that are transformative or
otherwise public in nature, and reducing the undesired chilling effect of copyright law on
potential users. Increasing the utilization and production of copyrighted works would
maximize the net social welfare; the greatest number of people would benefit by
expanding the number of permissible uses while still protecting the copyright holder’s
incentive to create. Creators need to maintain a clear understanding of what to expect
from the legal system (protection of their incentives and investments) as well as what
they must give up to users (permission to transform copyrighted works or otherwise use
them for the public good), and the framework provides such an understanding.
The tenets of labor theory are facially inconsistent with the concept of balancing
in intellectual property cases.386 Still, in cases where public or transformative uses
benefit (or do no harm) to the copyright holder’s market, findings of fair use would
enable copyright holders to recoup investment costs, while, at least in the case of
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See generally Part III-A, supra.
See generally Part III-B, supra.
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transformative uses, add new creative works to the public domain.
While personality theory emphasizes personal expression and moral rights rather
than economic rights,387 the proposed framework, in part, is reconcilable with personality
theory because it discourages private unlicensed uses that a copyright holder finds
morally or socially offensive. However, the challenge in reconciling personality theory
with the proposed framework lies in how to resolve the conflict between a creator’s moral
rights and the interest of the public in accessing a broader domain of creative works.388
Social planning theory, with its view toward developing a more just society,389
shares the emphasis of the proposed framework on protecting and encouraging
transformative and other public uses in cases where the unlicensed use poses no
economic harm to the copyright holder. Some of the proposals of social planning
theorists, such as to shorten the length of the copyright term, to curtail protection of
derivative uses, and to impose a compulsory licensing scheme on copyright holders might
offer even greater protection of the public interest. However, such theorists do not offer
any more direction than current utilitarian theorists as to where to draw the line between
fair and unfair uses.
Regardless of which intellectual property theory or theories courts invoke in
specific cases, they universally try to balance the private rights of the copyright holder
and the public interest in their fair use jurisprudence. The proposed framework directly
addresses this central principle of copyright law in cases where an unlicensed use
possibly benefits (and, at minimum, does not harm) a copyright holder’s market.
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See generally Part III-C, supra.
As the proposed framework assumes the acceptance of the current economic-based copyright system,
such reconciliation is beyond the scope of this article.
389
See generally Part III-D, supra.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The difficulty in applying the fair use doctrine, especially the fourth factor, is
largely attributable to a lack of consensus in defining the fundamental goals and
principles of intellectual property law. How courts should factor market benefit (or an
absence of market harm) into the fair use equation crystallizes the tension in copyright
law between private property rights and the public domain.
This tension spills over into other areas of intellectual property law as well. For
example, how strictly or liberally a court should interpret the doctrine of equivalents is a
question about where to draw the line between the private economic rights of inventors
and public access to technology.390 Similarly, the multi-factor “likelihood of confusion”
test for trademark infringement, similar to the four-factor fair use inquiry, is a difficult,
fact-specific inquiry that is much less about confusion and more about the extent to which
the U.S. trademark laws protect private economic interests in names and marks versus
making those same names and marks available to the public.391
A consequence of this tension in intellectual property law has been a trend over
the last few decades toward expanding the protections afforded to the holders of
copyrights, patents, and trademarks.392 However, a grant of a copyright or other
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See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002)
(upholding the doctrine of equivalents) (“The patent laws ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’
by rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly. The monopoly is a property right; and like any
property right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it
enables efficient investment in innovation. A patent holder should know what he owns, and the public
should know what he does not.”).
391
See William W. Fisher, III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in
the United States, 7-8 (1999), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf.
392
Id. at 10-12. Part of this can be attributed to the fact that intellectual property rights have taken on
more of the characteristics of property rights. Professor Fisher explains, “Gradually over the course of
American history, this discourse [focusing on limited monopolies] was supplanted by one centered on the
notion that rights to control the use and dissemination of information are forms of ‘property.’” Id. at 20.
Traditionally property rights are more absolute than contract rights and come with a broader set of
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intellectual property is, in fact, an exchange of rights—the private inventor or creator or
business receives certain rights in exchange for giving the public certain access to that
creativity and inventorship. This perception is more consistent with contract law than
property law—i.e. intellectual property holders have an expectancy of certain economic
protections in exchange for allowing public use of their creations under certain
circumstances. Courts already use many common law contract terms such as “good
faith” and “fair dealing” in trying to strike a balance between private economic rights and
the public interest in intellectual property law.393
Such a paradigmatic shift in thinking about intellectual property rights is probably
a long time away (and beyond the scope of this article). But even if the smaller-scale
framework advanced in Part V is applied to J. K. Rowling’s suit against the New York
Daily News,394 we should conclude that the New York Daily News’ publication of
excerpts from Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix does not constitute fair use
because the use was private and non-transformative. However, the framework also
acknowledges a neutral or positive market effect to the author’s market.

A fair

resolution, therefore, would award the copyright holder statutory damages for
infringement but offset those damages against the value of any benefit to the copyright
holder’s market. But Harry Potter himself cannot read the divination tea leaves and

remedies. See generally id. at 20-23. “There was once a theory that the law of trademarks and tradenames
was an attempt to protect the consumer against the ‘passing off’ of inferior goods under misleading labels.
Increasingly the courts have departed from any such theory and have come to view this branch of law as a
protection of property rights in diverse economically valuable sale devices. In practice, injunctive relief is
being extended today to realms where no actual danger of confusion to the consumer is present.” Id. at 22
(quoting Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
814-17 (1935)).
393
See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 10 (citing Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 563 (1985); Time v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rosemont
Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966); Holdridge v. Knight Publishing Corp.,
214 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1963)).
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predict the next stages of the fair use debate. It is clear thought that we must move from
incantations of Stupefy—meant to halt forward progress—in favor of Alohomora—a
charm that opens closed doors.

394

See supra note 1.
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